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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
MONUC, was deployed following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 
of 1999.  A core pillar of the mission, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programs have attempted to address the issue of multiple armed nonstate actors 
operating, primarily in the country’s eastern districts of Ituri, North and South Kivu.  
MONUC’s DDR initiatives can be subdivided into the national DDR program for 
Congolese combatants and the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration 
and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups.  Although there has been some 
success in the DDR(RR) programs over the past 12 years of UN deployment, rampant 
insecurity attributed to the presence of armed groups in the DRC continues to plague the 
east.  An examination of the DDR process in the east reveals that although the UN has 
assisted in the implementation of large, multidimensional DDR and DDRRR programs 
in, the situational context, voluntary approach, and links to Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
have all proven inadequate to achieving stability though DDR. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Following on the heels of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the United 
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) first deployed a 
monitoring force of just over 5,000 personnel.  Eleven years later, the renamed United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) shifted its strategy from supporting the transitional government to 
protecting civilians in the east of the country.  In the process, MONUSCO has become 
the largest and most expensive UN mission to date, totaling 24,378 personnel with an 
annual budget of just under $1.4 billion.1 
 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of national armed 
groups and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration 
(DDRRR) of foreign armed groups operating in the eastern Congolese provinces of Ituri 
and North and South Kivu were scarcely addressed in the early years of the UN’s 
presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  Now, they have become the 
central focus of MONUSCO’s mandate.  But, as the importance of DDR(RR) activities in 
the east have gained recognition, so have criticisms of the program’s effectiveness, 
especially as armed violence continues to exact a toll on the civilian population of the 
DRC.  This thesis seeks to examine the growth and evolution of DDR practices both in 
the context of the complex situation that exists in the eastern DRC and how they measure 
up to broader UN DDR standards.  How have the DDR(RR) programs in the eastern DRC 
evolved over time? Why do armed opposition groups continue to pose security concerns 
despite over a decade of ongoing UN DDR(RR) initiatives? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have experienced rapid 
change in response to the emergence of widespread, protracted intrastate conflict.  As 
                                                 
1 “United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
accessed May 10, 2011, http://monusco.unmissions.org/. 
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mission strategies and procedures adjust to meet the growing challenge of nonstate actors 
and their use of violence against civilian populations, DDR programs have become 
increasingly accepted as vital pieces of many mission mandates.  Currently 
administrating thirteen DDR programs worldwide, the United Nations has taken a lead in 
DDR program development with a comprehensive approach it outlined in its 2006 
publication Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards or the 
IDDRS. 
 Between three and five million Congolese are estimated to have perished since 
1994, which ranks the DRC among the worst cases of prolonged human suffering since 
World War II.  The central role DDR(RR) currently plays in stabilizing the eastern DRC 
makes its success highly relevant to ongoing UN interventions and future UN DDR 
doctrine.  Understanding the role of UN DDR(RR) activities in the DRC not only adds 
value to the ongoing MONUSCO operation, but also will contribute to the operational 
knowledge in the larger DDR community as a whole. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Although the Congolese wars are officially over, violence and the suffering of the 
civilian population in the eastern provinces of the DRC continues, despite the efforts of 
the national government and the presence of the world’s largest UN mission.  Confronted 
with widespread violence perpetrated by multiple armed groups, UN peacekeepers have 
increased and broadened their DDR activities as a primary tool to reduce violence and 
restore order.  But, as the mission’s leadership and strategy change, barriers are emerging 
that question the efficacy of disarmament and demobilization tactics, challenge the 
success of the reintegration of ex-combatants, and cast doubt on the viability of DDR as a 
tool for achieving peace in the eastern DRC.  Scholars and practitioners worldwide stand 
to gain significant insight into successful DDR by understanding how these shifts in DDR 
strategy came about in the DRC, and what this might mean both for international DDR 
standards and the success of MONUSCO as a peacekeeping mission. 
The argument of this thesis is that, once the voluntary approach to DDR(RR) 
failed, MONUC adopted more coercive tactics.  Not only are these tactics often at odds 
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with its mandate to seek voluntary compliance from armed groups, but also, they have 
not addressed the underlying factors that encourage armed violence in the Eastern Congo. 
As a consequence, despite the burgeoning scope and cost of the mission, armed groups 
have proliferated and the security situation for the local population continues to be 
critical in the eastern provinces of the country. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The substantial literature on the DRC reflects the length, complexity, and 
immensity of conflict.  Additionally, a multitude of works regarding UN DDR activities 
have been published in response to the numerous UN-led DDR initiatives around the 
world.  This research is focused on material relevant to UN DDR activities in the eastern 
Congolese provinces since the introduction of MONUC in 1999.  The literature review 
will begin with a brief survey of the historical situation in the eastern DRC in general, 
then move to UN DDR activity specifically, and finally look at the thematic topics. 
 The three most relevant works pertaining to historical accounts of the conflict are 
those of Prunier, Stearns, and Autesserre.2 While Prunier and Stearns each provide 
comprehensive historical accounts of the conflict beginning with the end of the Rwandan 
civil war in 1994, Autessere presents an in-depth assessment of international intervention 
in the east.  Complementing these scholarly works are a series of reports on the current 






                                                 
2 Gerard Prunier, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Jason K.Stearns, Dancing with 
Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011); 
Se´verine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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Migration Review, and the Congressional Research Service.3  While these works disagree 
in points of analysis and suggestions for successful conflict resolution, they concur that 
the international community has thus far failed to achieve peace. 
 The literature concerned with intervention in the DRC is unanimous that the UN 
mission in the eastern DRC, despite certain areas of progress, has failed so far to fulfill its 
mandate to protect the populations and organizations in the eastern provinces.  An 
integral part of the overall strategy for creating a lasting peace, the DDR(RR) process has 
been scrutinized by the academic and peacekeeping communities in order to better 
understand its role in conflict reduction.  The first major theme to emerge in the literature 
relating to DDR(RR) processes in the DRC is the inability of the international community 
to tailor a program to adequately address a problem of this magnitude.  Utilizing two 
metrics for measuring success in MONUC’s deployment in the DRC, Denis Tull finds 
that the UN mission’s approach to the problem has been both reactive and under-
resourced.4  Acknowledging the immense complexities associated with the conflict, and 
the failure of MONUC’s DDR strategy, a body of literature has emerged supporting a 
locally oriented, or bottom-up approach, in DDR activities, challenging the current focus 
on top-down strategies.5  
                                                 
3 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2011/20 (January 
17, 2011); United Nations Security Council, Thirty-First Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2010/164 (March 30, 
2010); United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc 
S/2010/512 (October 8, 2010); Oxford Analytica, “Congo-Kinshasa: FDLR Threat Continues in 
Kivus,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, July 23, 2009; Pierra Jacquemot, “The Dynamics of 
Instability in Eastern DRC,” Forced Migration Review, No.36 (2010); Ted Dagne, The Democratic 
Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, September 1, 2011). 
4 Denis M.Tull.“Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting 
War.” International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2 (2009): 215–230 
5 Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security, Vol.2, No.1 (2009), 29–58; Macartan Humphreys, and 
Jeremy M.Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.51, 
No.4 (August 2007), p.531; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo; Jeremy Ginifer, “Peacebuilding in the 
Congo: Mission Impossible?” International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No. 3 (Fall 2002), 121–128. 
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 As with all DDR operations worldwide, timing has been a key issue in the 
DDR(RR) process as supported by MONUC.  Discussed by general DDR theorists6 as 
well as case studies concerned with the DRC,7 timely implementation of a DDR process 
reduces the number of weapons and returns former combatants to civil society.  The 
successful implementation of voluntary DDR relies on the adherence by belligerent 
groups to a comprehensive peace agreement.8  Because peace agreements failed in the 
DRC, MONUC forces have struggled to demobilize groups, turning to coercive tactics in 
some cases.9  This perceived shift in mandate by UN forces has clearly changed the 
dynamics of international intervention and challenged the assumption that voluntary 
engagement in DDR activities is necessary for success.  While there exists very sparse 
literature pertaining to the use of coercive force versus voluntary recruitment in a DDR 
process, a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis by Shane Doolan10 is one of the few 
works analyzing the use of coercive DDR in peacekeeping operations.  There is no in-
depth analysis directly addressing coercive versus voluntary DDR strategies in the 
eastern DRC. 
 Another constant theme in the literature concerned with DDR(RR) activities in 
the DRC has been the interrelationship between DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR).  
The situation in the eastern DRC presents a unique problem set for UN peacekeeping 
                                                 
6 Nat J.Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction,” in Robert I.Rotberg, ed., When States Fail 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.170; United States Institute of Peace, and 
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
(Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace: U.S.Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute, 2009). 
7 Eirin Mobekk, “Security Sector Reform,” International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2 (2009), 
273–286; Tull, “Peacekeeping in DRC.” 
8 Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild 
and Elizabeth M.Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141; United States Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction; Prunier, Africa's World War. 
9 Jim Terrie, “The use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC,” African 
Security Review, Vol.18, No.1 (2009); Now on PBS, “Can the U.N.Keep the Peace?” (Washington, DC: 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 2009). 
10 Shane R Doolan, “Coercive Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) can it be 
Successful?” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2008). 
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personnel as violent abuses of the population are carried out not only by the multitude of 
armed nonstate actors, but also by an unruly national army, the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), and even by undisciplined UN peacekeeping 
personnel.  Discussing the nexus between SSR and DDR in the DRC, several authors11 
advocate a reevaluation of DDR-SSR processes, such as integration into the FARDC, 
rather than disarmament and demobilization of armed rebel groups.  But until the 
FARDC can be trusted as a professional army representative of the country’s national 
interest, DDR of nonstate actors will prove particularly difficult.  Likewise, without 
DDR, SSR will lack an important tool to reduce the means for armed groups to wage 
campaigns of violence against the government and civilian populations of the east.  But 
while this linkage is clearly indicated by a broad range of publications, the interface of 
strategies to bridge the gaps between SSR, DDR, and weapons reduction remain poorly 
understood.12  
 The final major discussion relating to UN-sponsored DDR in the eastern DRC 
pertains to the reintegration process.  Widely regarded as the most challenging, 
expensive, time-consuming, but also the most important part of the DDR process, 
reintegration in the DRC is further complicated by the additional need for repatriation 
and resettlement of armed foreign groups.  While there does exist extensive literature on 
                                                 
11Mobekk, “Security Sector Reform,” 273–286; Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, “MONUC 
and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4 (October 2008), 
501–516; Henri Boshoff, “Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo: The Numbers Game,” African Security Review, Vol.18, No.1 (March 2009), 70–73. 
12 Robert Muggah, “Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and 
Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.27, No.1 (2006), 190; 
Alan Bryden, Understanding the DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa (New York, NY: 
United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2007). 
 7
repatriation strategies,13 Hans Romkema De Veenhoop provides an excellent summation 
of the current repatriation activities in the DRC.14  
 This thesis will focus in how these different areas of DDR have been addressed in 
the DRC, what have been the biggest barriers to success, and how the UN mission has 
adapted its DDR policy in an attempt to create a successful DDR program.  Specifically, 
the gaps addressed by this thesis include exploring bottom-up local solutions to problems 
of reintegration and identifying shifts in MONUC DDR policy towards more coercive 
methods in an attempt forcibly to disarm and process combatants. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize process tracing of DDR activities in the DRC since the deployment 
of MONUC in 1999.  Aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge responsible for 
influencing contemporary DDR practices and guidelines, the focus of this work will be 
on explaining the conflict in the DRC, how DDR activities have been utilized by the 
international community in the eastern provinces, and comparing these findings to current 
UN DDR guidelines in order to answer the major research question posed above. 
 In addition to the literature summarized in the above review, this thesis will draw 
upon all pertinent archived UN Security Council resolutions and reports of the Secretary 
General to gain a better understanding of background and current DDR practices in the 
DRC.  This understanding will be comparatively analyzed against current UN DDR 
standards including the updated 2011 IDDRS and the 2010 publication Second 
Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Practices in Peace  
                                                 
13 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” 531; Colletta et al., 
“Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ,” 170–181; Sigrid Willibald, “Does Money Work? Cash 
Transfers to Ex-Combatants in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Processes,” Disasters, Vol.30, No.3 (2006), 316; United States Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles; 
Hugo de Vries, and Nikkie Wiegink, “Breaking Up and Going Home? Contesting Two Assumptions in the 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants,” International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.1 
(2011), 38. 
14 Hans Romkema de Veenhoop, Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & 
Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Washington, DC: Multi-
country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007). 
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Operations.  These two publications will provide a comprehensive understanding of 
current UN DDR standards and practices against which to measure the experience in the 
eastern DRC. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will provide an overview of contemporary UN DDR doctrine.  
Focusing on the 2006 IDDRS, a comparison between Traditional DDR and Second 
Generation DDR is leveraged to explain the concept of Integrated DDR.  Chapter III 
provides a brief background on state formation and internal conflict in the DRC to 
provide context for the conflict into which MONUC deployed in 1999.  Chapter IV traces 
the deployment of MONUC forces and the development of DDR and DDRRR activities.  
Chapter V examines the use of a voluntary framework for DDR and explores how 
MONUC has utilized coercive means to achieve its goals.  Chapter VI explores linkages 
with Security Sector Reform and how the process of army integration is at odds with 
broader DDR goals.  Chapter VII concludes the thesis and provides lessons learned for 
future DDR missions.  The overall aim of this thesis is to provide analysis on the 
development and implementation of the ongoing UN DDR mission in the DRC and how 





II. DDR BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
First published in 2006, the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) represent a major milestone in the development of UN 
DDR doctrine.  The product of an interagency group comprised of fifteen UN agencies, 
funds, departments, and programs,15 the IDDRS is the first attempt to document an all-
encompassing framework for DDR operations at both the strategic and operational levels.  
Although the emergence of the IDDRS is the first formal document addressing UN DDR 
protocol, it is not the first emergence of UN sponsored DDR activities within its 
peacekeeping missions.  The first UN actions dealing with DDR date back to Security 
Council Resolution 650 in 1990 which expanded the mandate of the United Nations 
Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to include the demobilization of anti-
government elements in Nicaragua.16  Since then, the UN has participated in 
administrating or assisting DDR campaigns in more than 20 countries.17  
In order to understand current UN DDR doctrine, this chapter traces the 
development of UN DDR strategy and policy from its initial beginnings in the 1990s to 
the current concept of Second Generation DDR and the IDDRS guidelines.  Surveying 
documents from the Security Council, UNDP, UNDPKO, and prominent DDR scholars 
and practitioners, a pattern is established that has ultimately led to the adoption of the 
                                                 
15 United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (IAWG-DDR), Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration Standards, (New York, NY: United Nations, 2010): 281.The IAWG is composed of: 
Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), International Labour 
Organization (ILO), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations 
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United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO); and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) 
16 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 650, (March 27, 1990) 
17 IAWG-DDR, Operational Guide, 13. 
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IDDRS as a standard.  Planners and practitioners are advised to utilize the IDDRS as a 
strong source of operational planning and implementation, but are cautioned to remain 
aware of the specific context of the conflict zones and the flexibility required to remain 
effective in such varied environments.  Breaking down the development of DDR doctrine 
into two broad categories, contemporary DDR operations are characterized as 
Traditional, Second Generation, but most often, are a combination of the two. 
B. TRADITIONAL DDR 
In the decade following ONUCA, DDR activities emerged in many UN 
peacekeeping operations including missions to Guatemala, El Salvador, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Liberia, Angola, Croatia, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the 
Central African Republic.18  Yet, as these activities were recognized as pivotal aspects to 
UN peace-building, there was no formalized understanding of DDR as a practice.  But by 
2000, two important documents emerged providing the first articulation of Traditional 
DDR.  In response to a request from the Security Council, the 2000 Report of the 
Secretary General: The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration details specific roles and responsibilities of UN 
peacekeeping personnel during DDR activities within a UN peacekeeping mission.  
Published within months of the Secretary-General’s report, the UN DPKO’s 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping 
Environment discusses many of the same points but provides a further breakdown of 
DDR related tasks with specific procedures to ensure success. 
Traditional DDR is first described in these two documents and has since been 
further developed and implemented in a multitude of missions to the present.  Concerned 
primarily with logistical operations around the removal of weapons and swift processing 
of ex-combatants, Traditional DDR tends to be administered in a top-down fashion and 
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focuses on short-term results.19  Often understood as a linear process aimed at completely 
eliminating the military capabilities of belligerent forces, Traditional DDR generally 
begins with disarmament.  “Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and 
where demobilization ends, reintegration commences.”20  Within this paradigm, the first, 
and often most visible, phase is disarmament. 
1. Disarmament 
 Disarmament can be characterized as:  
The collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a 
conflict zone.  It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of 
combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms management 
programs, including their safe storage and their final disposition, which 
may entail their destruction.21 
Put simply, disarmament is the removal and management of weapons in a given conflict, 
or post-conflict zone.  Essentially, the disarmament process fulfills two main roles in the 
peace process.  First, the physical elimination of weapons quite literally removes the 
means by which belligerents can wage war and incite violence.  Second, the absence of 
arms helps create a stable environment wherein combatants may build confidence in the 
peace process and a common sense of security.22  Thus by removing the means for 
violence, a secure setting is created where parties may be confident in their safety and 
trust in the peace-building process. 
Procedurally, disarmament generally follows a timeline of assembling cantonment 
zones for the concentration and disarmament of forces, registry of collected weapons and 
ammunition, and proper disposal or storage of said weapons.  Simultaneous with these 
activities, UN forces are also concerned with weapons management both locally and 
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21 United Nations Security Council, Peacekeeping in Disarmament, 2. 
22 Spear, “Disarmament,” 142.  
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regionally.  This includes the promotion and publication of legal frameworks for the 
ownership and procurement of weapons including enforcement mechanisms, as well as 
the prevention of illicit arms trafficking into the conflict zone.23  At the ground level, 
these issues are aided by the presence of UN peacekeepers to observe arms flows and 
police borders.  However, to effectively address these areas the UN must supplement 
local level policing with international arms embargos and regional appeal for the 
termination of the flow of arms. 
2. Demobilization 
 Following on the heels of disarmament in Traditional DDR, demobilization  
Refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their 
military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian 
life.  It generally entails registration of former combatants; some kind of 
assistance to enable them to meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, 
and transportation to their home communities.  It may be followed by 
recruitment into a new, unified military force.24 
Aimed at deconstructing the organizational structure of the armed group, demobilization 
disbands armed units, eliminates the chain of command including organizational rank and 
status, and removes the symbols of a combatant’s military life (such as weapons, 
uniforms and insignias). In addition to organizational deconstruction, demobilization 
should also be a chance for DDR personnel to collect vital information on the ex-
combatants that aids in the forthcoming reintegration process.25  Surveying needs and 
aspirations, providing medical examinations, and gathering information on where ex-
combatants and their dependents are from are a few areas of information vital to the 
reintegration process. 
                                                 
23 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament…Principles and 
Guidelines, 55–56. 
24 United Nations Security Council, Peacekeeping in Disarmament, 2. 
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 Following initial processing of disarmed combatants, traditional concepts of 
demobilization value the creation of cantonment sites to secure continued commitment to 
demobilization by ex-combatants.  Cantonment sites provide two main contributions to 
the demobilization process.  First, by keeping all the demobilizing forces in one location, 
DDR practitioners are capable of promising security and basic needs to the ex-
combatants without taking away the possibility of re-mobilizing in the event of a breach 
in peace and a sudden need to take up arms.  While this backslide into conflict seems to 
be at odds with the DDR process, the assurance that they can be ready to mobilize with 
their unit increases buy-in during the demobilization process.  Second, cantonment sites 
provide various UN and NGO groups a venue to begin sensitization training, education 
and vocational training, and medical and psychological treatment of ex-combatants.  
These training opportunities and evaluations are critical for successful demobilization and 
reintegration. 
It should be noted that not contexts call for the reintegration of demobilized forces 
into civilian life.  In cases where the peace agreement mandates the creation of a new, 
unified national armed force, demobilized combatants are often called upon to be 
integrated into the new national force.26  Although a significantly easier transition for 
most combatants than that of reintegration into civilian society, integration into a new 
armed forces should not cut the corners of disarmament and demobilization.  As will be 
shown in the case of the DRC, attempts to absorb rebel units into the national army failed 
to deconstruct previous personal and ideological allegiances to the former rebel 
movement and thus resulted in issues of parallel chains of command and even a 
resumption of armed opposition by former rebel units.27 
 
                                                 
26 Spear, “Disarmament,” 147. 
27 United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 14 May 2009 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2009/253 (May 18, 2009), 8. 
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3. Reintegration 
The final, and often most challenging, phase in Traditional DDR is reintegration. 
Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their 
families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life.  It 
generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind 
compensation, training, and job- and income-generating projects.28 
Reintegration during a Traditional DDR operation must therefore provide ex-combatants, 
and the communities they return to, a sense of physical and economic security to ensure 
they do not relapse back into organized violence.  Reintegration is a crucial part of peace-
building as it incentivizes a return to society for ex-combatants through the provision of 
security and economic and social opportunities.  Reintegration addresses issues of 
security in several ways.  First, it must provide security to the disarmed combatants so 
they continue to feel safe from the conflict in which they were once armed.  Second, a 
reintegration strategy must address the possibility of “microinsecurities” where members 
of the general population feel at risk of being victimized by crimes perpetrated by former 
combatants.  Finally, reintegration must address “macroinsecurities” amongst society as a 
displeased or underfunded ex-combatants may lead to fear of organized state 
insurrection.29 
Procedurally, reintegration must work to develop economic opportunities in order 
to ensure continued commitment by ex-combatants.  This first takes the form of 
education and vocational training.  Basic education and vocational training increases the 
abilities of ex-combatants, and their dependents, to secure employment and contribute to 
the local economy.  But, beyond the development of skills, job creation and infrastructure 
development are also necessary.  These are important areas for consideration as in many 
post-conflict settings employment tends to be oversaturated with labor and injecting new 
bodies into the job market without creating new opportunities will create points of 
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confliction in the community.  Additionally, community level development initiatives and 
infrastructure improvement provides assistance to the local economy, creating an 
environment that benefits all. 
4. General Characteristics of Traditional DDR 
The above concepts were initially formed in the 1990s and early 2000s by DDR 
scholars and practitioners as an attempt to standardize DDR practices.  In addition to the 
knowledge pertaining to the individual phases of DDR, a few general characteristics for 
operations have also emerged.  Relevant to the overall success of DDR operations, these 
five points of consideration are vital to the overall success of a Traditional DDR program.  
The first area relates to whether the DDR program is carried out utilizing voluntary or 
coercive means.  Do combatants elect to disarm, enter a cantonment site, and reintegrate, 
or are they forced to following a military loss to opposing belligerent or peace-
enforcement forces? Second, adequate planning is needed at all phases of DDR to ensure 
the proper implementation of the program.  Third, the issue of timing is relevant, both 
with regards to when to start the overall program, and when to transition between 
different phases.  Fourth, targeting is important.  Who should the DDR program target 
and for what reasons? Finally, a process of verification is needed at every level of the 
process. 
The record of voluntary versus coerced DDR programs is asymmetrical.  Since 
1990, the vast majority of operations have required a voluntary framework.  Voluntary 
DDR is commonly associated with UN deployments following a cease-fire or peace 
agreement.  This stands in contrast to coercive disarmament operations, which are 
deployed by either clear victors our outside interveners, such as India in Sri Lanka, the 
U.S. in Somalia and Haiti, and UN interventions in Albania and Haiti.30  Nevertheless, 
DDR operations that were begun under a voluntary framework are often forced to adopt 
coercive means as belligerent forces either adopt semi-permissive participation, or renege 
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on their peace agreements and disavow their participation in the voluntary program.31 
Thus a major aspect of the deployment of a DDR program is the degree to which the 
targeted population is committed to the process, and the degree to which the 
implementing force is committed to the use of force to ensure compliance. 
At both the micro and macro levels, adequate planning is needed before the 
implementation of Traditional DDR programs.  Planning for DDR operations includes, 
among other things, identifying who is to be processed, to what extend they will be 
disarmed (i.e., just heavy weapons or all light and heavy armaments), the creation of a 
viable but flexible timeline of events, locations for arms collections and cantonment sites, 
logistics relating to the transportation of ex-combatants back to their communities, and 
organization of funding for the various steps in the process.32  Additionally, adequate 
time must be allotted for the implementation of the program.  Expectations must be set 
with donors for both material and financial resources to ensure that the operation is seen 
through to its conclusion. 
Issues of timing and targeting are of direct concern to Traditional DDR 
practitioners.  From the very onset of a peace agreement it is important to include an 
initial framework for the establishment of a DDR program to maintain momentum and 
increase commitment to the peace processes.33  Likewise, security conditions will have a 
direct effect on when a belligerent force is willing to give up their arms.  Targeting the 
proper groups to be included in the program is imperative to ensure successful 
reintegration.  This entails addressing the needs of not only the ex-combatants, but also 
those of their dependents and the communities they are to reintegrate into.  Traditional 
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DDR doctrine also calls for special attention to be given to the reintegration of child 
soldiers, recommending a minimum of three years’ commitment of resources to 
guarantee successful reintegration with society.34 
The final area of consideration in Traditional DDR operations is the development 
of clear and manageable verification methods, especially during the disarmament process.  
Important at every level of the process, verification ensures that the DDR processes are 
continuing in a clear and transparent fashion and provide early warning indicators for 
potential spoilers to the process.  Verification methods include data crosschecking, UN 
monitoring and observing forces, and, in some cases, enforcement search and seizures of 
weapons and ammunition.35  
Since the first mention of DDR in ONUCA in 1989, Traditional DDR has 
developed through a multitude of missions.  As is the case with most peace operations, 
outright success is hard to define.  But, there have been noteworthy accomplishments 
achieved through Traditional DDR in UN missions to Mozambique, El Salvador,36 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone.37  Consequently, there have also been tangible lessons learned 
from the failures of Traditional DDR efforts in UN deployments in Cambodia, Somalia, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Botched attempts at Traditional DDR do not 
necessarily indicate poorly implemented programs, rather DDR scholars and practitioners 
have found Traditional DDR methods insufficient at addressing the underlying issues of 
armed conflict in certain cases.  In order to address these complex, multivariate conflict 
zones, DDR scholars and practitioners have begun exploring more dynamic approaches 
to Traditional DDR.  Although not formally coined as a specific doctrine, many in the 
peace-building community have come to refer to it as Second Generation DDR. 
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C. SECOND GENERATION DDR 
Often misunderstood to be the “latest model” in a single evolving DDR process, 
Second Generation DDR does not intend to replace Traditional methods, rather it 
provides an additional, supplemental approach.  Second Generation operations can thus 
be conducted in place of, before, alongside, or after Traditional programs.38  While 
Traditional DDR continues to focus on combatants present in military structures, Second 
Generation programs are concerned with larger communities affected by armed 
violence.39  Thus, the nature of Second Generation practices are approached from a 
bottom-up methodology.  Instead of a linear process of graduated steps between 
disarmament, demobilization, and ultimately reintegration, Second Generation DDR 
approaches the three simultaneously.  This more holistic approach focuses on three broad 
categories: post-conflict stabilization measures, specific group targeting, and alternative 
approaches to addressing disarmament and unregulated weapons.40  
1. Post-conflict Stabilization  
Post-conflict stabilization measures are undertaken immediately after the 
secession of hostilities, in sub-national or local contexts, and in environments where the 
security sector is weak or absent.41  A central theme in this area is the debate regarding 
the use of cash in the DDR process, particularly during disarmament and demobilization.  
A 2006 article by Sigrid Willibald effectively surveys the pros and cons of cash for 
immediate stabilization, suggesting cash has the potential to attract ex-combatants and 
increase compliance with disarmament, accelerate the disarmament process, diffuse 
political unrest, soften the impact of DDR activities on the communities, and can 
stimulate infrastructure and institutional capacity development in contexts where they are 
absent.  However beneficial these areas may be, cash transfers also have the potential 
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drawbacks of being manipulated to purchase new arms and better weapons, fuel 
expectations and demands, disincentive economic reintegration, cause community 
resentment by members not enrolled in the DDR program, and are likely to be abused due 
to the liquid nature of cash resources and the lack of financial management capacity of 
ex-combatants and the absence of banking and other financial infrastructure.42  
Regardless of the benefits and risks, the use of cash in Second Generation DDR 
activities must be approached carefully and coincide with economic development and 
job-creation to ensure a sustainable economy.  This can take the form of ex-combatant 
short-term employment schemes, but only if followed on by longer-term community 
development.  If done correctly, a successful DDR program can actually contribute to the 
growth of the local economy.43  Generally, Second Generation approaches to job creation 
follow up the immediate public employment programs with a livelihood creation program 
that focuses on mobilizing the community to take on projects that increase employment 
over both the short- and long-term.44  Although this often takes the form of increased 
agricultural development, tourism, light industry, and manufacturing, the informal 
employment sector is also targeted to provide livelihoods for ex-combatants that cannot 
get a legitimate job. 
2. Identifying and Targeting Groups 
The second focal point of Second Generation DDR is the identifying and targeting 
of specific groups.  Building on the targeting policies of Traditional DDR, Second 
Generation practices highlight the significance on nontraditional combatants, the role of 
ex-combatant commanders in the DDR process, and specific regard for the role of women 
and child-soldiers in post-conflict society.  Beginning with nontraditional combatants, 
Second Generation programs aim to identify and incorporate militias, self-defense 
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groups, gangs, and criminal networks into the DDR program.  But these nontraditional 
groups often possess different characteristics from those of the formal military structures 
involved in Traditional DDR.  For example, community defense forces often emerge in 
conflict zones as a response to abuses by rebel and government forces.  These forces are 
based on a sense of community safety and increased opportunity and therefore may not 
benefit from a Traditional demobilization and reintegration program that seeks to break 
their ranks and separate their social and political structures.  This is evident in the 
ongoing UN DDR operation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo where 
local Mai-Mai militias did not understand the concept of demobilization and reintegration 
when they had never really left their traditional village area.45  
Second Generation programs have also recognized the political and economic 
significance of commanders and leadership of force structures undergoing DDR.  These 
key leadership positions are addressed due to their inherent ability to command and 
control the demobilizing forces that positions them to be an asset of control, or, a 
potential spoiler.  Additionally, the economic role of commanders has become 
recognized.  In many conflict zones, commanders have taken control over economic 
activities including the production and circulation of goods.46  But the role of ex-
commanders in the DDR process needs to be monitored with fervor due to the 
dichotomous position they have to support the process or create serious roadblocks. 
In addition to nontraditional combatants, Second Generation DDR also takes into 
account the role of women, at risk youth, and child-soldiers during and post-conflict.  
Women and child soldiers merit special attention due to the unique roles they have played 
in protracted conflicts.  Firstly, women are often combatants, fighting alongside men.  
This must be taken into consideration during the DDR process as the gender roles of the 
communities they are reintegrating into may dictate a different kind of relationship for 
women ex-combatants.  Therefore cash incentives and vocational training should be 
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careful not to disadvantage women ex-combatants.47  Additionally, scars of sexual crimes 
and abuses often exert an immense physical and psychological toll on women in post-
conflict settings, an issue that should be adequately addressed.  Specialized treatment is 
also important for former child soldiers who need long-term assistance and re-
socialization in addition to the vocational training intended to increase self-reliance.48  
At-risk youth, whether former child soldiers or not, present a real risk of instability in 
post-conflict environments.  Programs aimed at community-based education and welfare 
for orphaned or disenfranchised youth are powerful tools towards maintaining 
community peace.   
3. Flexibility and Alternative Approaches 
The final area of Second Generation DDR is the provision of alternative 
approaches for dealing with situations where disarmament is faced with more complexity 
or where Traditional DDR is not working.49  These alternative approaches vary widely 
depending on the context of the specific conflict and region the program is deployed in.  
Programs designed to incentivize disarmament vary in format, often tailored to the 
specific conditions present in the conflict zone.  Additionally, arms controls are 
approached from both the supply and the demand side, adding community reforms and 
national regulation to international embargos and import bans. 
D. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
Amended in 2010, the IDDRS effectively has integrated Traditional and Second 
Generation DDR into a working guide for both policy makers and field practitioners.  
Agreed upon by the two most active UN players in DDR, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP), the 
IDDRS enjoys the input from an additional 13 UN organizations that play essential roles 
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in UN DDR programs.  With 13 DDR programs currently being undertaken by the UN,50 
the operational success of the IDDRS has yet to be determined.  Recent correlations with 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) have sparked new exploration into DDR as a part of larger 
overall security stabilization strategy.51  But as prominent peace-building strategists 
celebrate the latest frameworks for DDR and SSR, others grow concerned that “with the 
newly-crafted DDR and SSR hammers every post-war context is treated as a nail.”52  
In conclusion, the IDDRS is an exciting embodiment of over 2 decades of DDR 
knowledge.  An operational document that lays out a comprehensive framework for 
planning and implementing DDR operations in a variety of conflict settings, the IDDRS 
should continue to be leveraged as the principle source of advice in DDR deployments.  
However, DDR scholars and practitioners should remain cognizant of the huge role that 
circumstance plays in conflict formation and resolution.  While frameworks for the 
IDDRS provide excellent avenues from which to approach a given conflict, they 
ultimately can prove ineffective when rigidly applied to unique cultural, historical, and 
geographic contexts.  Thus as the DDR community continues to move forward in the 
development and fine-tuning of its guiding documents, it should maintain flexibility as a 
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III. CONFLICT IN THE DRC: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo lies in the center of the African continent, 
situated between the Gulf of Guinea and the great lakes of eastern Africa.  Comprising a 
vast 905,355 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the combined area of Western 
Europe or over 3 times the size of the U.S. state of Texas.  Encompassing the majority of 
the large Congo River basin, the DRC is characterized by dense jungles, a maze of 
waterways, and the diverse settlement of over 200 ethno-linguistic groups.  Experiencing 
large population growths during the Bantu migrations from present day Nigeria many 
centuries ago, the people of present day DRC are mainly of Bantu origin, sharing related, 
but not identical, cultural and linguistic traits.53  There is a large diversity of ethno-
linguistic groups present in the DRC, and many of them straddle borders with other 
modern African states.  The multi-national nature of the country is the result of some 
population movements since modern African state formation following the 
decolonization movement of the mid-1900s but is mainly indicative of the difference 
between how pre-colonial African states and European colonizers viewed state 
boundaries and power projection.  Beginning by briefly summarizing the history of state 
formation, this chapter will review the current conflict in the east from its origins up to 
the deployment of MONUC in 1999, and conclude with a survey of the specific 
demographics of the populations living in the eastern provinces to provide a formative 
understanding of the different groups and their relationships. 
B. HISTORY OF STATE FORMATION 
Characterized by nuclei of power, originating from a central source and 
dissipating with distance, pre-colonial African kingdoms rarely enjoyed a monopoly of 
power and authority beyond their initial geographic core.  Low population densities, 
abundant resources and immense geographic variations made the projection of power and 
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authority impractical and uneconomical for pre-colonial African leadership.54  Indicative 
of the situation in the Congo basin by the time of European exploration in the 19th 
century, there existed an array of independent settlements spanning from the Kongo 
Kingdom on the Atlantic coast to the small but centralized kingdoms of Rwanda and 
Burundi on the shores of lakes Kivu and Tanganyika, respectively.  But as European 
imperialism expanded, so did their desire for clear, demarcated colonial borders. 
Emerging from the Berlin conference of 1884, the Congo Free State was 
established as an absolute monarchy to be ruled by King Leopold II of Belgium.  
Although the Berlin conference had granted Leopold sovereign power over the area, the 
Belgian parliament proved unwilling to take responsibility for the administration of the 
state, authorizing the action under the condition that Leopold would become the sole ruler 
of the Congo Free State, void of any financial or political commitment on the part of 
Belgium.  Faced with the considerable financial burden to personal royal resources, 
Leopold sought the assistance from private enterprise, mercenary forces, and missionary 
groups to help in his conquest.55 
Emerging as Leopold’s personal administration and military force, The Force 
Publique was established to construct infrastructure over the vast area and to forcefully 
bring the varied populations of the Congo Basin under Leopold’s rule.  Lasting more than 
three decades and claiming the lives of an estimated 70,000 Africans, the campaign for 
the settlement of the Congo Free State was carried out militarily by numerous European 
and African mercenaries and socially by a myriad of European missionary societies.  
Leopold’s Congo became synonymous with brutal suppression and militarized rule.  In 
addition to numerous cruel acts aimed at subduing the local populations, The Force 
Publique carried out a violent campaign to chase off Arab slave traders from East 
Africa.56  But, possibly, the worst impact of Leopold’s decades of direct rule for the 
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future of the DRC was that the entire economy and civil society was run by Europeans.57 
Finally succumbing to protests in Europe of Leopold’s rule, Belgium officially took 
control of the Congolese state in 1908.  Although the social and economic situation 
improved under Belgian rule, resentment continued to grow among the Congolese as 
Belgians continued to occupy all of the professional and administrative positions until 
independence in 1960. 
As European powers began to accept decolonization, a new political class of 
Congolese emerged.  Similar to the political formations occurring throughout the African 
continent, the process of forming multi-party democracy in the Congo faced massive 
hurdles inherent to the multi-national state created by colonial demarcation.  The 
Congolese longed for self-governance as nationalism emerged at both the state and sub-
state levels.  Addressing the heterogeneous nature of Congolese society, the political 
parties emerging in the newly free Congo closely related to nonpolitical organizations 
including tribal, kinship associations, cultural organizations, and economic interest 
groups, each seeking to promote the specific interests of the constituencies they 
represented.58  After the initial election results in 1960, a government was formed with 
the Congolese National Movement (MNC), led by prime-minister elect Patrice 
Lumumba, winning the parliamentary elections and Joseph Kasa-Vubu of the Alliance of 
Bakongo (ABAKO) elected president.  But the success of this first republic was short 
lived.  Within months of independence, a series of events unfolded—crushing the 
disintegrating the government and spiraling the entire country into war. 
C. EMERGING POLITICAL CRISIS 
Commonly referred to as “The First Congo Crisis,” the period from 1960 to 1965 
saw the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Katanga cessation, and the deployment of 
the largest UN peacekeeping mission to date.  Beginning with a coup in July of 1960, the 
First Congo Crisis was not over until the successful military coup of Joseph Mobutu in 
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November of 1965.59  Disenfranchised by the expatriate officers of the Congolese 
National Army (ANC), formerly the Force Publique, soldiers rebelled against their white 
officers in a chain reaction across the country.  Adding to the chaos, a political movement 
lead by Moise Tshombe declared independence in the mineral rich Katanga region in 
June 1960.60  Shortly thereafter, a deathblow was delivered to the national government as 
President Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba, sparking a personal conflict 
and bringing into question the legitimacy of the constitution. 
Encouraged by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and approved by the 
Security Council, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed in July of 1960 with 
unprecedented speed and force and moved to stabilize the country and provide security.  
Peaking at 20,000 troops, armed with heavy weapons and specialized personnel from 28 
countries, the ONUC’s mandate authorized the use of force beyond the newly developed 
peacekeeping concept of self-defense yet fell short of articulating enforcement 
operations.61  While ONUC was partially successful at restoring order to the country, the 
frustrations experienced trying to provide a peace-enforcement mission in a vast country 
and multi-faceted conflict foreshadowed the challenges that would be experienced by 
MONUC and MONUSCO responding to crises in the eastern provinces of the Kivus and 
Ituri. 
The First Congo Crisis came to an end with the successful consolidation of power 
by General Joseph Mobutu in 1965.  Backed as a political moderate by the United States 
and Belgium, Mobutu became the undisputed ruler of the Congolese state from 1965 to 
1997.  With continued support by Western countries during the Cold War to fight off 
communism and ensure access to the vast resource wealth of the country, Mobutu’s 30 
years of corruption and poor rule crippled the country’s infrastructure.  Renaming the 
                                                 
59 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 95–96. 
60 Andrzej Sitkowski, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), 64. 
61 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 52–54. 
 27
country Zaire in 1971, Mobuto Sese Seko wa za Banga62 embraced the ideas of Zairian 
nationalism and manipulated the state’s federal arrangement to counter ethnic 
mobilization and secession movements.  With the end of the Cold War, however, Mobutu 
switched tactics and increasingly played ethnic groups against each other, manipulating 
the democratization process to maintain political dominance.63  By the end of his reign in 
the mid-1990s, Mobutu’s regime was desperately grasping for control over the gigantic 
Zairian state.  The infrastructure and economy were in shambles and Mobutu’s support 
from abroad had waned with the Cold War rivalry leaving a very rich man losing control 
of a very poor and disgruntled country.  The weakness of the Zairian state became 
evident when in 1996, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila and with support the 
Rwandan army, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL) invaded from the east, toppled the Mobutu regime, and set of a sequence of 
events that has left the eastern part of the country in a state of crisis to this day. 
D. THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, CONGO WARS, AND THE DEPLOYMENT 
OF MONUC 
Authorizing the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel in August of 
1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1258 established the United Nations Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the second UN deployment to the 
country since independence in 1960.  Initially aimed at providing transparency to the 
peace process following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement by the belligerent 
forces involved in the Second Congo War, MONUC deployed as a peace observation 
mission.  But as the agreement in Lusaka disintegrated and the country plunged back into 
conflict, MONUC was forced to grow and adapt.  Deployed as of July 2011 with 18,997 
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uniformed and 4,391 civilian personnel, MONUSCO64 has grown into the largest and 
most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in history, including one of the most expansive 
DDR operations, despite the formal ending of the Second Congo War in 2003.  To 
comprehend the need for such an extensive operation, and to understand the massive 
instability that still grips the country’s eastern districts, it is first relevant to review the 
origins of the conflict, beginning with the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the subsequent 
flow of refugees into the eastern Zaire. 
The origins of the Rwandan Genocide are well documented.  The social cleavages 
that led to genocide in the small African states of Rwanda and Burundi share common 
origins.  A mixture of grievances relating to class stratification, manipulation by colonial 
powers, ethnic mobilizations by post-colonial leadership, and tit-for-tat revenge have all 
played major roles for Tutsi-Hutu ethnic conflict.  The term “Tutsi” first emerged in 18th 
century Rwanda, originally describing an individual rich in cattle and with good social 
standing, while “Hutu” related to the status of a subordinate or follower.65  Capitalized 
upon by European colonizers, Tutsi and Hutu became ethnically charged terms as 
colonial authorities sought to empower the new Tutsi minority as an administrating class 
in an indirect rule structure.  Subsequently, great animosities formed between the two 
groups leading to political and social conflict following independence from Belgium in 
1960.  Forming political parties along Hutu and Tutsi lines, the Rwandan government 
became dominated by Hutu-affiliated politicians from the beginning of the independence 
process in 1959.  Violent clashes occurred between 1959–1964, and 1972–1973 leading to 
the exodus of over a half million Tutsi refugees.66  
In October of 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) invaded Rwanda from 
Uganda.  A political movement comprised of Rwandan Tutsi exiles, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) formed in Uganda with great assistance from Ugandan President 
Yoweri Musevini with the goal of retaking the Rwandan state from the incumbent Hutu 
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party.  The armed wing of the RPF, the RPA was led by General Paul Kagame following 
the death of RPA leader Fred Rwigema days into the campaign.  Seeking to gain control 
of the Rwandan state, the RPA and the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) fought a bloody 
war until a ceasefire was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993.  Intending to implement a 
power sharing government between the RPF and the incumbent Movement for 
Democracy and Development (MRND), the peace process was shattered when the 
President of Rwanda and leader of the MRND was assassinated in April of 1994.  While 
the true assassins have never been identified, ensuing pro-Hutu propaganda put into 
motion a countrywide campaign of terror carried out units of the FAR and pro-Hutu 
interahamwe militias.  The Rwandan genocide of 1994 claimed the lives of over 800,000 
Rwandans between April and July.  A scar on the pages of human history, the genocide 
was the most efficient mass murder ever orchestrated, the ramifications of which would 
have massive effects on the future of the entire Great Lakes region.  Following the 
conclusion of the ethnic pogrom in July of 1994 with an absolute RPA victory, the former 
Rwandan government fled into exile taking with them all of the money from the Central 
bank and herding approximately 2.1 million people into refugee camps in Zaire, Tanzania 
and Burundi.67 While violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutus appeared to be over, 
killings continued as an RPA counter genocide unfolded against suspected genocidaires 
in Rwanda with an untold number of casualties.  But the problems in eastern Zaire were 
just beginning. 
E. REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE KIVUS AND THE FALL OF ZAIRE 
Dissimilar to other refugee movements fleeing conflict, the mass exodus of 
Rwandans to eastern Zaire bore the characteristics of an organized system of mass 
mobilization for political purposes.68 Of the estimated 2.1 million refugees following the 
RPA victory, roughly 1.5 million settled in camps located in the North and South Kivu 
provinces of eastern Zaire.  Among these were the entire command structure of the ex-
FAR complemented by 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers.  Sympathetic to the deposed regime, 
                                                 
67 Prunier, Africa’s World War, 5–24. 
68 Ibid. 
 30
Mobutu and his dysfunctional Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) allowed the FAR, complete 
with weapons and transportation, to enter North and South Kivu and remain mobilized 
with the intent of continuing an armed struggle against the RPA.69 Facilitated by the 
massive inflow of international aid to address the growing refugee crisis, the former 
Rwandan government went about setting up a system of governance over the populations 
of refugees in a series of large camps around the city centers of Goma in North Kivu, and 
Bukavu in South Kivu.  Much to the dismay of the local Congolese populations living in 
the area, the massive influx of refugees set up extensive settlements, clearing forests for 
charcoal and building materials, stealing cattle, and erecting large refugee cities.  In an 
attempt to control the situation, the former Rwandan government and army leadership 
began exacting taxes on the local population and immediately began low-level military 
operations policing the area and making ready for a counter invasion to take back the 
Rwandan state.70  
To make the situation worse, there were increased arms flows into the area.  In 
addition to arms supplies from organizations within former Soviet bloc countries, Mobutu 
seized the opportunity to leverage the former Rwandan governments and Interahamwe 
militias to wage a proxy war against the regimes in Kigali and Kampala with whom his 
relations had soured.71 As the situation spiraled out of control and armed incursions 
became frequent into Rwanda, it was not long before Kagame and the RPF leadership 
took action. 
The First Congo war was largely the effect of the presence of large numbers of 
hostile ex-FAR soldiers and Intrahamwe in Kivu provinces paired with the decay of 
Mobutu’s Zaire.  Spearheaded by the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, a 
coalition of heads of state from Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and 
Angola met to determine the downfall of Mobutu who they perceived as “the shame of 
Africa.”72 Through largely Ugandan and Rwandan material, logistical, and training 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 25. 
70 Ibid, 26. 
71 Ibid., 28. 
72 Ibid., 67. 
 31
assistance, Laurent-Desire Kabila and his AFDL invaded eastern Zaire in late October of 
1996.  Assisted by armed militias and Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, the AFDL fought 
their way to Kinshasa by May of 1997.  Facing imminent defeat and suffering from acute 
prostate cancer, Mobutu fled to Morocco where he died shortly thereafter.  Sworn in as 
president on September 7, 1997, Kabila went about restructuring the nation and renaming 
it the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
But Kabila’s tenure as president of the newly anointed DRC was to be short lived.  
Adopting many of the corrupt, authoritarian, and dynastic qualities of Mobutu’s rule, 
Kabila lost popular support among Congolese and, more importantly, alienated his 
Rwandan backers and his Tutsi allies in the AFDL.73 The subsequent fallout was to be 
catastrophic.  Acting out of national interests ranging from providing border security to 
financial interests in the abundant resources present in the DRC, a multitude of regional 
states, including state-backed rebel groups, flooded into the Congo basin in what has 
since been coined Africa’s World War.  Concerned with securing their borders, and 
arguably, interested in mineral deposits, Uganda and Rwanda, with their respective rebel 
allies the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (RCD), invaded eastern DRC in late 1998 with the intention of securing the 
north and eastern regions of the DRC and disposing of Kabila’s regime.  Meanwhile, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola entered the fray.  Economically motivated, Zimbabwe’s 
Robert Mugabe was principally concerned with securing timber and mineral concessions.  
Pledging support for Kabila, a fellow South African Development Community (SADC) 
leader, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe provided troops to 
support the Congolese government, although allegations of interest in diamond extraction 
were rampant.  Finally, concern over the relationship between the longstanding Angolan 
rebel group the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the 
Rwandan and Ugandan governments led Angola to the aid of Kabila’s government with 
the long-term hope of weakening UNITA’s supply lines and bases in the DRC.74 By mid-
1999, Kabila and his allies managed to halt the rebels’ advance.  Taking advantage of the 
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stalemate that had emerged, delegations from the United States, European Union, 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), South Africa, Zambia, and Libya facilitated a 
ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia in 1999.  In addition to a cessation of hostilities, 
the agreement emphasized the holding of a national dialogue, a framework for national 
disarmament, and a request for the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation.75 
Responding with Security Council Resolution 1258, MONUC was born. 
F. THE EASTERN PROVINCES 
Often referred to as interlacustrine Africa, the area is characterized by the large 
lakes formed by a geological rift valley.  Home to large mountain ranges and dense 
equatorial forests, the region comprises the land spanning from the northern tip of Lake 
Albert in the DRC and Uganda, south to the western shores of Lake Malawi.  The 
western edge becomes lost in the tropical forests found descending from the 5,000 meter 
Rwenzori massif into the dense Congo basin, while the eastern periphery is defined by 
the vast Serengeti plains found southwest of Lake Victoria in central Tanzania.  
Comprised by populations of modern day Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Malawi, the region is home to a multitude of heterogeneous cultural and 
linguistic traditions. 
While the region’s populations are broadly defined linguistically as Eastern 
Bantu, the demographics can be further sub-divided into five major categories.  North of 
Lake Victoria, a group of Luganda and Lusoga dialects dominate central Uganda.  
Stretching in a long, narrow linguistic belt from Lake Albert to the area southwest of 
Lake Victoria is a group comprised mainly of Runyoro, Rutoro, Ruhaya, Runyambo, and 
Ruzinza speakers.  The southwestern tip of Uganda and northern Rwanda is dominated 
by the Runyankore linguistic group.  Located east of the Virunga volcanoes in eastern 
DRC, and west of the Malagarasi river in Tanzania, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, and Kiha 
form a linguistic block the characterizes the majority of the Rwandan and Burundian 
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populations.  Finally, spanning the western shores of Lakes Tanganyika, Kivu, and 
Edward are a group of linguistically similar people speaking Kifuriru, Mashi, Kihavu, 
Kihunde, Rukonjo, and Runande.76  
 Although this work is not an exercise in linguistics, the above definitions provide 
valuable context towards understanding the demographic breakdown of the populations 
involved in the ongoing conflict in the region.  Coinciding with long-term history and 
political cleavages, an understanding of the populations in this region, and how they 
relate linguistically greatly aids in comprehending the formation of volatile ethnic 
relationships.  In addition to the observation that these linguistic groupings have often 
coincided with the formation of local-level ethnic and political alignments, and were thus 
the foundations for many contemporary local-level grievances and conflict, these groups 
were also the subject of study for many 19th and 20th century European anthropologists, 
linguists, geographers, and ethnographers.77 Harmfully leveraged by colonial 
administrations in systems of indirect rule, these originally linguistic delineations were 
utilized by German and Belgian authorities to raise specific groups’ status and power 
over that of their neighbors.  These manipulations, although not solely responsible, have 
had lasting influence over many of the micro-level conflicts experienced in the region. 
 The epicenter of the war that erupted in 1996, the Zairian provinces of North and 
South Kivu hosted a wide array of conflicting ethnic groups and armed political 
movements well before the massive population influxes following the Rwandan genocide 
in 1994.  With the above cursory understanding of the ethno-linguistic breakdown of the 
interlacustrine region, it is now pertinent to hone in on the demographics of the Kivus 
specifically in order to understand the context into which the region plunged into large-
scale conflict. 
 Situated along the western boarders of Rwanda and Uganda, North Kivu is noted 
for its dense population, heavy rainfall, and varied terrain.  Its capital, Goma, sits on the 
north shore of Lake Kivu and shares a metropolitan area with the Rwandan city of 
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Gisenyi.  Ethnic tensions in North Kivu, although varied in nature, are generally 
correlated with land ownership.  The population may be broadly broken into two 
categories: the Congolese autochtones (including a majority of Runande speakers) and 
populations of Kinyarwanda speakers.  Although Kinyarwanda populations have been 
present in the region since well before the establishment of the Congolese state, their 
presence experienced significant growth in numbers during the Mission d’Immigration 
des Banyarwanda carried out by the Belgians in 1937.  Aimed at providing agricultural 
laborers from the overpopulated Rwanda, the program moved some 85,000 Banyarwanda 
into the eastern DRC, the majority settling in North Kivu.78 Including both Tutsi and 
Hutu identities, the newly arrived immigrants provided cultural and community support 
to the minority Banyarwandan populations, much to the resentment of the Congolese 
autochtone groups.  Creating conflicts over citizenship and land ownership, the situation 
was exacerbated by Mobutu as he sought to elevate Kinyarwandan political leadership to 
bolster support in the district as the Kivus were notoriously a troubled spot for his regime 
politically.79 
 The situation in South Kivu is somewhat different.  Due to a far lower population 
density, South Kivu does not experience the same land pressures as its northern neighbor.  
However, social and political cleavages do exist in a similar fashion to those of North 
Kivu with autochtone groups, primarily between Congolese Babembe and Bafulero 
groups and the “nonnative” Kinyarwandan speaking Banyamulenge groups and 
Burundian immigrants.  Choosing to identify as Banyamulenge (referring to the Mulenge 
area in which they primarily settled) in order to differentiate between the Banyarwandan 
identity that were viewed as outsiders, the group played a pivotal role in the 1965 Simba 
rebellion as they accepted weapons and training from Mobutu forces to defend their 
settlements against rebel abuses.80 
It was within this state of tension between Congolese autochtone groups and the 
North Kivu Banyarwanda and South Kivu Banyamulenge that 1.5 million Rwandan, 
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primarily Hutu, refugees poured into the Kivus between July and August of 1994 fleeing 
the genocide in neighboring Rwanda.  Aggravating the already present ethnic conflict in 
the region, the arrival of these refugees can be viewed from two points of view.  The first, 
seen as pro-RPF, observes the arrival of large numbers of Hutu genocidaires and 
Interahamwe militiamen, complete with weapons and force structures of the ex-FAR, 
proceeded to prey on the local Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge populations who 
identified with Tutsi ancestry.  The second view, coined as anti-RPF, interprets the 
presence of the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge as predators abusing the local 
Congolese autochtone groups.81 Needless to say, the ensuing situation was marred with 
complexity, political manipulation, land rights, identity issues, and the overarching air of 
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IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF DDR ACTIVITIES  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Serving as the foundation for the MONUC DDR(RR) programs, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1291 mandated MONUC to assist the Joint Military Commission82 
with “the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration of 
all members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1 of the [Lusaka] 
Ceasefire Agreement.”83 The original Traditional DDR process in the east evolved over 
time to become a more integrated approach incorporating Second Generation DDR 
practices.  Although initially promising in its timing and intent, a comprehensive DDR 
program in the DRC did not come to fruition for several years.  Even though a 
comprehensive approach has been in effect for over seven years, MONUC supported 
DDR and DDRRR has produced mixed results.  Affected by an array of exogenous and 
endogenous factors, comprehensive DDR and DDRRR programs in the east have 
struggled to provide short and long-term stability and security due to combination of 
factors.  First, the political context into which MONUC deployed was extremely 
complicated: Congolese state institution were weak to nonexistent; there was a large 
number of warring parties each with their own political agendas; the presence of foreign 
troops had greatly destabilized the peace process; finally, the availability of easily 
extractable minerals financed the arming and training of rebel groups.  And if this were 
not bad enough, DDR programs suffered from MONUC’s inconsistent mandate, a lack of 
coordination, and insufficient resources to provide a force adequate to execute DDR 
activities.  This chapter will trace the development of DDR and DDRRR programs in the 
DRC. 
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B. EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
1. The Situation 
Well before Laurent Kabila took power in Kinshasa, the institutions of the 
Congolese state were in shambles.  The country, compartmentalized by vast geographic 
barriers, lacked critical infrastructure and possessed few governing institutions.  Although 
Kabila sat in the capital and enjoyed the title of head of state, his ability to project power 
and provide governance to the far eastern districts was nonexistent.  This inability to 
provide state functions would be a debilitating factor for the regime during the peace 
process as the national army has struggled to implement and engage in DDR functions. 
Similar to Kabila’s weak hold over the state institutions, the political nature of the 
armed opposition groups who opposed Kabila’s rule at the signing of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement presented a major hurdle to the DDR process.  The opposition did 
not represent a single homogeneous group but rather represented different regions and 
ethnicities.  The armed groups in the east also contained large numbers of Ugandan and 
Rwandan troops.  Although the heads of state from the Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe and leadership from the RCD and the Movement for the 
MLC all signed the ceasefire of 1999, successfully disarming and repatriating all foreign 
troops proved to be a problem.  Only one month after the signing of the agreement, RPA 
and UPDF forces clashed in the east resulting in over 600 casualties, which soured 
relations between the Ugandan and Rwandan governments.84 Additionally, the fracturing 
of the RCD movement into RCD-G and RCD-ML further complicated the conflict 
dynamics.  If an internationally brokered DDR program mandated by the Lusaka 
Agreement were going to succeed, all parties had to be on board. 
The prevalence of easily extractable resources is also a major issue for DDR.  
Rich in mineral deposits including diamonds, gold, copper, and coltan, rebel groups 
operating in the DRC are able to finance their movements through the illegal extraction 
of resources.  When combined with the vast and largely unregulated borders, the ability 
of armed rebel movements to maintain large weapons stocks was a very real threat to 
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DDR operations.  Although the UN recognized this threat and included arms embargos in 
early stages of MONUC’s deployment, the continual inflow of small arms and light 
weapons into the region has been greatly counter-productive to DDR efforts. 
2. The Armed Groups 
The following provides a brief overview of armed rebel groups operating in the 
DRC between 1999 and 2011: 
a. Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma) – DRC  
Emerging in August of 1998, RCD-Goma was largely funded and 
controlled by the RPF in Rwanda.  Propped up by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi as a 
force to challenge and overthrow Laurent Kabila, the RCD-Goma consisted largely of 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulege populations of the Kivu districts.  Despite maintaining a 
goal of establishing a healthy democracy and protecting eastern Tutsi populations, the 
RCD-G’s track record proved to be dismal.  Preying on local populations and operating 
as a de facto arm of the RPA, the RCD-G was cited multiple times by MONUC and 
human rights organizations for massacres and other abuses of the population.85 
Transformed into a political party with the majority of its soldiers incorporated into the 
new Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the RCD-G 
ceased operating as an armed opposition group by late 2004.86 
b. Congolese Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-
ML)–DRC  
Originating from the broader RCD movement, the RCD-ML emerged in 
September 1998 centering on the northeastern city of Bunia.  Formed after Wamba dia 
Wamba failed to secure leadership in the RCD-G in the lead up to the Lusaka Peace 
Agreement, RCD-G accepted continued assistance from Uganda until the relationship 
soured when Uganda attempted to coerce the RCD-ML leadership into merging with the 
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Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC).  Although originally aligned with the 
goals of the broader RCD movement to oust DRC president Laurent Kabila, the RCD-
ML, with strong ties to ethnic Lendu groups, engaged in ethnic conflict with Hema 
populations who enjoyed Ugandan support.  This led to ongoing fighting by the RCD-ML 
against local Hema militias in addition to military clashes with the RCD-G.87 Similar to 
the RCD-G, the RCD-ML now operates as a political party in the DRC government, its 
armed elements incorporated into the FARDC.88 
c. Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) – DRC  
Cultivated by Jean-Pierre Bemba with the support of President Musevini 
in Kampala, the MLC emerged in November of 1998 in Gbadolite on DRC’s northern 
border with the Central African Republic.  In addition to strong Ugandan support, Bemba 
leveraged relationships with highly capable former Mobutu officers.89 Growing into a 
highly capable political and military force, the MLC enjoyed several victories over 
Kabila’s forces and his Chadian allies.  In addition to its military capability, the MLC 
possessed popular support unmatched by the other rebel factions.  Bemba went on to play 
an important role in the transitional government as vice-president, as the MLC 
transformed into a political party, and its military elements incorporated into the 
FARDC.90 
d. National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) – DRC  
Emerging in May 2004 under the leadership of General Laurent Nkunda 
and his deputy Bosco Ntaganda, a conglomeration of fighters drawn primarily from the 
FARDC’s integrated RCD-G troop base invaded and occupied Bukavu in South Kivu 
claiming to prevent a potential genocide of the Banyamulenge population.  Later 
retreating to North Kivu, Nkunda negotiated a process of “mixage” whereby his units 
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would be incorporated back into the FARDC, without demobilizing and reorganizing his 
units.  The failure to demobilize these fighters was a mistake because Nkunda continued 
autonomous operations against FDLR elements, committing serious human rights 
violations against populations throughout the Kivus.  Reorganizing as a political 
movement in 2006, the CNDP emerged as a pro-Tutsi force, which exacerbated ethnic 
tensions between Banyarwanda and Banyamulege groups and their Congolese 
counterparts.91 The conflict between CNDP and the FDLR was finally brought to an end 
with the arrest of Laurent Nkunda by Rwandan forces in January of 2009 and the 
reincorporation of CNDP forces, now led by former deputy Ntaganda, into the FARDC.92 
e. Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) – DRC  
Operating in the Ituri province of the DRC, the FNI militia is dominated 
by ethnic Lendus.  Formed as militia to protect Lendu populations against rival Hema 
groups, the FNI fought vigorously to control lucrative mining sites that are rich in gold.  
The FNI funded itself largely from illegal resource extraction and was reported to have 
direct links to AngloGold Ashanti, a corporate mining company that sought gold 
extraction in Ituri.93 Cited for numerous human rights violations, the movement is 
purported to have links with UPDF and assisted with Ugandan mineral acquisition in the 
Ituri.  The FNI maintained a strong presence in Ituri, fighting rival Hema group Union of 
Congolese Patriots (UPC) and on occasion attacking MONUC forces.  Following several 
rounds of DDR and the subsequent arrest of FNI leadership in February of 2008, the 
movement has largely been pacified. 
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f. Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) – DRC  
Juxtaposed to the Lendu dominated FNI militia in Ituri, the UPC 
represented ethnic Hema community interests.  Operating in Ituri in the early 2000s, the 
UPC funded its movement by illegal mineral extraction, similar to their Lendu 
counterparts.  The group was reported to maintain relations with Rwanda who sought to 
leverage the movement against the Ugandan supported FNI.  The vast majority of the 
UPC has been processed through the national DDR program, their leadership arrested and 
handed over to the ICC in March 2006. 
g. Mai Mai Militias – DRC  
While all the other nonstate actors in the eastern DRC are in some way 
connected to an outside actor, whether by funding, political aims, or foreign fighters, the 
Mai Mai are a distinctly Congolese phenomenon.  An umbrella term referring to a small 
group of fighters who have banded together to protect their community from rebel and 
government threats, Mai Mai militias appear to lack a political center of gravity.  Some 
groups remain loyal to the Congolese government while others look to outside support 
from Uganda or Rwanda.  Still others have allied with rebel groups such as the FDLR.  
Although defensive in theory, different Mai Mai groups have perpetrated human rights 
abuses.94 Present before the conflict began, Mai Mai continue to be major players in 
armed conflict in the east and a primary target for MONUC’s DDR operation. 
h. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) –
Rwanda  
Currently, the largest armed opposition group operating in the eastern 
DRC, the FDLR are the primary focus of the ongoing MONUSCO DDR(RR) operation.  
Formed in late 2000, the FDLR emerged as an umbrella organization comprised of the 
two Army for the Liberation of Rwanda groups (ALIR I & II) operating in the Kivu 
provinces during the Second Congo War.  Made up mainly of ex-FAR forces, including 
genocidaires and Interahamwe militias who fled after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 
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FDLR was closely aligned with Joseph Kabila’s government as a proxy against Rwandan 
and Ugandan supported groups in the east.  The withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan 
forces in 2002–2003 led to a shift in support for the FDRL forces as they became a target 
of DDRRR operations by MONUC.  With a current estimated strength of between 6,000 
and 8,00095 members, the FLDR seeks to regain control of the Rwandan state and 
espouses hardline, anti-Tutsi rhetoric. 
i. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – Uganda  
A major factor leading to the eventual UPDF invasion of northeastern 
DRC was the presence of ADF bases.  Supplied largely by the Sudanese intelligence 
services to wage a proxy war against Uganda (a response to the heavy support the SPLA 
received from Uganda in South Sudan), the ADF promoted a heavily militarized Islamic 
agenda, carrying out raids into southwest Uganda from bases in the Congolese Rwenzori 
Mountains.96 Largely dismantled by Ugandan offensives carried out in late 1998, the 
movement has since been dormant.  A joint FARDC and UPDF 2010 mop-up operation 
displaced 100,000 Congolese IDPs.97 
j. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – Uganda 
Infamous among 20th century rebel groups and synonymous with human 
rights abuses, kidnapping, child soldiering and cult-like beliefs, the LRA continues to 
operate in equatorial Africa without any clear stated political or social goals.  Originating 
as a Ugandan rebel group in the mid-1990s, the LRA has since been pushed out of 
northern Uganda into South Sudan, and finally into DRC and the CAR where it currently 
operates on a limited basis.98 Although not a major actor in the Congolese wars and the 
current instability in the east, the LRA is nevertheless a dangerous actor that poses a 
constant threat to the populations in its area of operation. 
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k. Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) – Burundi  
The armed wing of the Hutu dominated opposition party the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), the FDD maintained a large presence in 
South Kivu in 2002 allied with local Mai Mai militias and Kabila’s regime in Kinshasa.99 
The group signed a comprehensive agreement with the government of Burundi in 2005 
but did not transform into a major political party. 
l. National Forces of Liberation (FNL) – Burundi  
Unlike the FDD, the forces of the FNL have resisted negotiations and 
sought an outright victory over the Burundian government.  Although a 2005 peace 
agreement dismantled large portions of the movement, small groups persist in South 
Kivu.  Largely viewed as a carryover of a past conflict by the current Burundian 
government, the last few FNL fighters remain on the Burundian border surviving off 
fishing in Lake Tanganyika.100 
C. ENDOGENOUS FACTORS 
MONUC’s DDR performance was severely hindered by slow adaptation to the 
changing conflict environment.  Deploying in the wake of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, MONUC established a three-phase plan that pushed DDR to the third phase, 
to be undertaken once military observers had been deployed and a peacekeeping force 
was present to monitor the disengagement of forces.  Unfortunately, the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement carried little weight in the war-torn east.  MONUC’s sluggish adjustment of 
its DDR programs in the face of a rapidly changing conflict environment can be 
explained by two factors: First, like most UN peacekeeping deployments, external 
support has been both tardy and inconsistent.  Second, national and international bodies 
failed to coordinate DDR and DDRRR initiatives.  This has since created a complex web 
of overlapping and duplicative international, bilateral, and regional programs.  Although 
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MONUC is supposed to integrate these efforts, so far it has proven unable to ensure UN 
wide coherence or coordinate the array of bilateral and multinational organizations 
engaged in DDR-related programs.101  
1. International Support for the Mission 
These problems of coordination occurred in spite of the fact that the severity of 
the problem was well recognized internationally.  In 1999, newly appointed U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke spearheaded an initiative to get the UN 
involved.  However, Holbrooke hesitated to support the deployment UN peacekeepers in 
the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement.102 Meanwhile, France argued in the 
Security Council that the immediate deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers was necessary 
and that a comprehensive peace agreement would not materialize absent a heavy UN 
troop presence.  Despite this plea, the United States remained cautious of supporting a 
large peace enforcement operation to disarm nonstate actors.103 It was becoming clear 
that the international community recognized the seriousness of the situation yet remained 
unwilling to provide immediate support to an operation in the region absent national 
interests and a mission framework. 
2. DDR Actors and Initiatives  
Since the very beginning of the DDR process in the DRC, the proliferation of 
various DDR bodies, donors, structures, and relationships complicated the DDR 
environment.  Although MONUC has played a crucial role in the ongoing DDR and 
DDRRR activities in the eastern provinces, it is not the only actor involved in the 
process.  Focusing on the main initiatives, this section will provide an overview of the 
UN programs, the MDRP lead by World Bank, the DDR and DDRRR structures as 
mandated by the Congolese government, and the role that MONUC played in each.  
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a. Government of DRC Initiatives 
On 18 December 2003, President Kabila issued three presidential decrees 
creating the framework for GoDRC DDR activities.  Establishing three different bodies 
concerned with conceptual and policy aspects, program implementation, and financial 
management, the bodies were intended to organize all DDR and DDRRR efforts in the 
country.  The first, an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (CI-DDR), was tasked with DDR orientation and project 
conceptualization.104 Second, the National Commission of Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reinsertion (CONADER) was placed in charge of program execution and 
coordination.  Finally, a funding management committee, the Committee for the 
Administration of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Funds (CGFDR) was 
created to provide financial oversight and funds allocation to the DDR programs.  
Although these bodies were positive developments in the organization of DDR activities 
by the Congolese government, they did not become immediately functional.  The three 
organizations made sense structurally; however, the process lacked a coherent overall 
strategy.  This problem was rectified with the creation of the National DDR Program 
(PNDDR), developed with the assistance of the UNDP, MONUC and Belgium in June 
2004.105 
b. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program 
Operating between 2002 and 2009 under the World Bank, the Multi-
Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was created to address the 
macro problem of proliferated armed groups operating across borders in the Great Lakes 
region.  Concerned with demographics and terrain from seven different countries, the 
MDRP was an enormously complex and technical program intended to address an 
estimated 350,000 combatants from Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, 
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Republic of Congo, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.106 Focused on the organization of 
funds relating to DDR and DDRRR activities in the Great Lakes region, the MDRP was a 
multilateral program funded by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the European Commission.107 Although 
established in 2002, the MDRP did not become a significant actor in the DDR activities 
in the DRC until initial funding began in2004.  Subsequently, the establishment of a 
Coordinated Joint Operation Centre (CCOC) in February and March 2005, which was 
jointly managed between the MDRP and the Congolese government, acted as a 
coordination mechanism to unify the efforts of the various DDR actors in the DRC and 
optimize the implementation of the PNDDR. 
c. Additional DDRRR Initiatives  
Because the process of DDRRR involved the repatriation of combatants 
across national boundaries, a number of additional programs emerged to aid DDRRR.  
First, and arguably most prevalent in the early years of the DDRRR process, was the 
efforts made by the Rwandan government to forcefully repatriate armed rebels while the 
RPA still maintained significant numbers of troops in the east.  Concerned with 
destroying the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) movements (the group did not 
coalesce into the FDLR until after the RPA had left Congo in 2002), the RPA reduced the 
ALIR strength from an estimated 40,000 to 12–15,000.  Although this force reduction 
signaled a significant accomplishment, it failed to dismantle the FDLR command and 
control, which continued to field large numbers of troops under the FLDR banner.108 
Most active in 2003, The Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) operated as a 
mechanism to monitor and implement the bilateral Pretoria agreement of July 2002.  
Developed jointly by MONUC and the government of South Africa, the TPVM was 
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leveraged by the latter to develop a series of Disarmament and Repatriation activities in 
addition to the mandated monitoring functions. Focusing primarily on elements of the 
FDLR, the TPVM managed to repatriate 400 combatants between January 2003 and 
February 2004.109 Finally, civil society groups have played an important, albeit less 
recognized, role in facilitating the disarmament and repatriation of foreign combatants in 
the east.  Acting to reduce community violence and sensitize combatants to the MONUC 
DDRRR initiatives, local NGOs, churches and businessmen have helped to aid the 
repatriation process at the local level.110 
D. MONUC’S DDR MANDATE 
 Administered by the CCOC and CONADER, the PNDDR program was designed 
to address the myriad of armed nonstate actors operating throughout the vast country.  On 
January 24, 2004, the Military Integration Structure (SMI) was established to create a 
dual-track process by which all combatants entering the PNDDR would be pooled before 
entering into a demobilization and reintegration track or integration into the national 
army.111 Administered by the CCOC and CONADER, MONUC was delegated the 
limited role of providing security in the vicinity of the brassage112 centers and oversight 
of weapons control during the dual track process.113 By spring of 2004, all of the major 
armed groups had agreed to the PNDDR terms and registered their forces for entrance 
into the program.  The numbers posed a daunting task, however, with the RCD-G 
registering 45,000, RCD-N 10,000, RCD-ML 15,000, MLC 30,000, and FAC 100-
200,000.114 Although the PNDDR seemed to be making progress, the program became 
stalled as the resulting security vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ugandan and 
Rwandan troops intensified ethnic conflict in Ituri and the Kivus.  Forced to redirect its 
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attention to peace enforcement and bringing a secession to hostilities, MONUC was 
unable to address DDR objectives until late 2004 when a combination of financial 
assistance from the MDRP, reforms in the Congolese PNDDR, and the deployment of a 
greater force strength allowed the UN finally to intensify DDR activities. 
 The PNDDR suffered further setbacks as ethnic militias in Ituri continued to resist 
the program claiming there was insufficient security to allow them to disarm.  The 
ongoing conflict between the FNI and UPC lacked a clear basis for settlement and the 
PNDDR failed to provide adequate sustainable livelihoods through its reintegration 
process.115 But the nature of the conflict did not allow MONUC the luxury of waiting for 
a comprehensive peace settlement between the groups.  Large deposits of gold allowed 
the rebel groups to continue financing their campaigns and with the violence largely 
directed at the population, MONUC was forced to act in accordance with its Chapter VII 
mandate to protect the population.  Acting in coordination with the FARDC, MONUC 
proceeded with a robust program of cordon and search operations to coerce militias to 
disarm between 2004 and 2005.  When on June 25, 2005, the disarmament and 
community reinsertion program ended, the UN claimed that 15,607 combatants had been 
disarmed and 6,200 weapons collected.116 While the operations had been successful in 
dismantling the UPC, the fact that so many weapons remained unaccounted for allowed 
elements of the FNI to continue to harass UN and FARDC forces. 
Concurrent to the setbacks experienced in Ituri, RCD-G forces in South Kivu 
continued to resist the PNDDR.  As the Congolese government began to assert itself in 
the Kivus and integrate, through brassage, soldiers from the rebel groups operating there, 
RCD-G officers, already in UN cantonment zones, rebelled against the regional FARDC 
commander.  Citing inequalities in FARDC integration and inadequate protection of the 
Banyamulege population in the region, a contingent of RCD-G marched on Bukavu, 
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taking it from UN and FARDC forces with little opposition.117 In addition to the havoc it 
wreaked on the population, the action illuminated the weakness in MONUC’s support 
role of the PNDDR strategy.  Of the rebelling RCD-G soldiers, the majority had already 
agreed to the PNDDR terms and some actually had already been integrated into the 
FARDC.  The Bukavu crisis emphasized that the DDR process lacked both the ability to 
provide security for the processing of combatants and, even once processed into the 
FARDC, there was limited ability to keep ex-combatants from returning to armed 
struggle. 
E. MONUC’S DDRRR MANDATE 
 Included in the Lusaka agreement, the first round of DDRRR activities was not 
launched until after the Pretoria Agreement in 2002.118 At Pretoria, Rwanda agreed to 
withdraw its army from the eastern DRC within 90 days while the Congolese government 
agreed to track down and forcefully repatriate the FDLR within the same time frame.119 
While Rwanda by and large kept to its scheduled troop withdrawals, the government in 
Kinshasa proved unable, and to a large extent uninterested, in disarming and repatriating 
the FDLR.  As this trend continued through 2003–2006, the implementation of DDRRR 
fell to MONUC and other local organizations.120 Thus, while MONUC operates as a 
facilitating force in the PNDDR process, it possesses a significantly larger leadership role 
in the DDRRR of foreign combatants.  The current MONUSCO DDRRR figures list 
19,810 combatants and dependents returned to Rwanda, 874 to Uganda, and 3,904 to 
Burundi between 2002 and 2011.121 Concerned primarily with the FDLR & FNL forces 
operating in the Kivu provinces, the ADF in the Rwenzori Mountains bordering Uganda, 
and LRA in the northern border areas of the Central African Republic and Republic of 
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Congo, the DDRRR process involves the cooperation of both the armed combatants and 
the nation of their origin.  As statistics from the past nine years show, the program has 
been relatively successful at repatriating a large number of foreign combatants.  In 2011, 
MONUSCO reported that the FDLR is estimated at 3,000 combatants, half of its 2008 
strength.122 Additionally, ADF, FNL, and LRA forces all number less than 500 each and 
remain well hidden, avoiding open confrontation.  Yet the remaining numbers of 
combatants, no matter how small, are still the perpetrators of horrendous crimes and have 
continuously refused voluntary repatriation. 
 The remaining groups represent the hardline leadership of these movements.  
With the case of the FNL and the ADF, the governments of Burundi and Uganda have 
granted amnesty and support reinsertion programs.  However, the situation for the FDLR 
is somewhat different.  Led by Rwandan ex-FAR and Interahamwe militiamen, their 
unwillingness to return to Rwanda, where they would likely face prosecution for 
genocide crimes, has made voluntary DDRRR impractical.123 While the LRA is worthy 
of mentioning, it holds a unique position within the Great Lakes conflict system and does 
not merit further examination for the analysis of MONUC DDRRR. 
MONUC’s participation in DDR and DDRRR programs has been shaped by two 
factors.  First, DDR and DDRRR both expect combatants to enter the programs on a 
voluntary basis. In supporting the PNDDR in Ituri and the Kivus, MONUC was expected 
to provide security of cantonment sites and collect arms from combatants on a voluntary 
basis.  Although this was practical, given the endogenous constrains on the mission’s 
capabilities, it assumed incorrectly that groups would voluntarily give up arms.  In the 
DDRRR of foreign combatants, a similar assumption was made that the foreign armed 
groups operating in the east would be compliant in the disarmament and repatriation 
process.  A second factor concerns the issue of integration of demobilized combatants 
into a national army.  The difficulties of incorporating a myriad of armed groups 
representing different ethnic and geographic grievances into a coherent national force 
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provides a major obstacle to the success of the PNDDR process.  The following two 
chapters will explore these two problems and conclude with a summary chapter 
establishing lessons learned from MONUC’s DDR and DDRRR programs. 
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V. A VOLUNTARY FRAMEWORK 
 Although both coercive and voluntary measures have been used in UN peace 
operations, there is no conclusive evidence to support the absolute success of one method 
over the other.  Additionally, it is incorrect to correlate a voluntary framework to Chapter 
VI peacekeeping operations, or a coercive framework to Chapter VII peace enforcement 
operations.124 Successful coercive tactics have been utilized in Haiti and Albania and 
failed in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.  Likewise, voluntary frameworks have 
produced successes in Namibia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and El Salvador yet struggled 
in Angola, Sudan, and Cote d’Ivoire.  Officially, MONUC only supports a voluntary 
structure for DDR and DDRRR.  Numerous Security Council Resolutions have outlined a 
voluntary DDR framework for MONUC including Resolution 1355 in June of 2001 and 
Resolution 1565 in October of 2004.  However, massive insecurities and a lack of 
voluntary cooperation by ex-combatants have led to coercive actions by MONUC forces 
on several occasions and internal criticism of its voluntary framework. 
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF A VOLUNTARY FRAMEWORK 
 Security Council Resolution 1355 established the norm for a voluntary DDRRR 
framework in 2001 authorizing “MONUC, consistent with the Secretary-General’s 
report, to assist, upon request, and within its capabilities, in the early implementation, on 
a voluntary basis, of the DDRR of armed groups…”125 This standard was further 
reinforced by Resolution 1376 in November of 2001 calling for the voluntary DDRRR of 
foreign combatants specifically, and Resolution 1493 calling for voluntary DDR of 
Congolese combatants.  This voluntary framework is still present at the time of this 
writing as can be seen in the MONUSCO DDRRR mandate:  
The current Resolution 1925 (2010) under the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
MONUSCO, and previous ones have also called for a comprehensive and 
voluntary Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of 
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Congolese armed groups, and the Disarmament, Demobilization, 
Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed 
groups for the long-term stability and economic development of the DR 
Congo.126  
Although a commitment to voluntary DDR and DDRRR of foreign combatants is seen in 
UN documentation spanning the entirety of the program, further analysis reveals that the 
mission has not always been consistent in utilizing voluntary methods. 
B. CRITICISM OF VOLUNTARY METHODS  
Concern regarding the voluntary framework first appeared in 2003 when the 
Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated: “Experience indicates that the 
MONUC voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and 
reintegration programme can be completed successfully only in conditions of reasonable 
security, and with the full cooperation of all parties concerned, including the armed 
groups themselves.”127 This assertion coincided with the recognition that, at the time, the 
RCD-G and various Mai Mai groups had not offered full cooperation and were in fact 
forcing demobilized combatants to abandon MONUC’s Lubero DDRRR reception center 
in North Kivu.  This is but one example of many acts of resistance by armed rebel 
groups, particularly by their hard-line leadership, to resist the MONUC implemented 
DDR processes.  In fact, in 2004, MONUC warned that “the continued pursuit of its 
voluntary repatriation would not succeed in resolving the problem within an acceptable 
time.”128 Additionally, a 2007 report funded by the World Bank revealed skepticism 
about the efficacy of the voluntary DDR amongst several MONUC officials, who favored 
applying greater military pressure.129 
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C. MANDATE CONTRADICTIONS 
The mission’s mandate is vague about the requirement for voluntary methods.  
Review of UN documents reveals a great deal of ambiguity that allows the mission’s 
mandate to be interpreted by force commanders to allow for the use of coercive DDR 
methods.  For example, Resolution 1565, paragraph 5(d), calls for MONUC to “facilitate 
the demobilization and voluntary repatriation of the disarmed foreign combatants and 
their dependents.” In the same resolution, the Security Council also “Authorizes 
MONUC to use all necessary means, within its capacity and in the areas where its armed 
units are deployed, to carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 4, subparagraphs (a) to (g) 
above, and in paragraph 5, subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) above.”130 While this 
tactfully avoided directly contradicting paragraph 5(d), it did authorize the use of “all 
necessary means” including support of disarmament operations led by the FARDC, 
contribution to the national program of DDR, and arms collection and seizure.  Thus, 
seemingly contradictory statements were left for UN force commanders to resolve in the 
field. 
D. COERCIVE ACTION 
 The contradictions became more acute as MONUC began engaging armed groups 
with much greater force.  The first of these operations came to fruition following 
frustrations in the DDR process in Ituri.  As ethnic conflict between the UPC and FNI 
groups in Ituri began to spiral out of control following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops 
in 2003, the UN was forced to ramp up its militarized presence to provide security over 
the population.  In addition to an increased UN presence, and responding to the 
inefficiency of CONADER to address the situation, the Congolese government launched 
the Disarmament and Community Reinsertion (DCR) program.  While the DCR program 
had succeeded in demobilizing 15,811 combatants, it had only collected an estimated 
20% of the weapons in the area.  In the presence of continued community insecurity and 
a stalled reinsertion program, almost all of those who had demobilized returned to the 
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bush and rearmed.131 Finally, on 25 February  2005, facing continued armed violence and 
resistance to the DDR process, the FNI attacked and killed 9 Bangladeshi peacekeepers.  
Responding with overwhelming force, MONUC’s Eastern Division deployed extensive 
forces killing 50–60 FNI militia.132 The response, although criticized by some as a 
punitive action, was reinforced by high ranking mission leadership including The Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General who set a April 1 deadline for the militias to 
enter the disarmament program, and the MONUC military chief who stated “If you do 
not surrender your arms by 1 April you will be treated like armed bandits and war 
criminals and we will chase you.”133  
 Clearly, these statements do not reflect the ideals of voluntary disarmament.  But 
the security situation on the ground seemed to have left little choice.  As MONUC forces 
deployed in greater numbers to protect the civilian population, it was forced to engage 
belligerent forces.  Once it had defeated these forces in combat, was it supposed to 
simply allow them to return to their camps and plead with them to volunteer? 
Withstanding criticism of coercive practices, including those who suggested using 
passive measures such as arms embargos, despite the proven ineffectiveness of such 
actions,134 the UN explored utilizing robust practices in other areas as well.  In July of 
2005, the UN led simultaneous operations in the Walungu territory of South Kivu.  
Coined Operation Iron First and Operation Falcon Sweep, the concurrent land and air 
campaigns were an attempt to root out members of the FDLR, disarm them, and return 
them to Rwanda.  However, as stated by MONUC military officials, the main objective 
was to reduce human rights abuses, possibly explaining why MONUC’s DDRRR unit 
was only marginally involved.135 
 Just seven months after the operations in Walungu commenced, MONUC 
partnered with FARDC forces and moved, once again, against FDLR forces in the 
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Bunyakiri territory.  But similar to the Walungu operation, the joint MONUC-FARDC 
force proved ineffective at dismantling and repatriating the FDLR forces in the area.  The 
operation can, in fact, be cited as causing more problems as they pushed the FDLR forces 
into other communities where they were able to operate and abuse the local population 
with impunity.136 Further adding to the conundrum was the unruly FARDC.  Committing 
massive human rights violations, rife with corruption, and disorganized by parallel 
command structures of former rebel groups integrated, but not assimilated, into its ranks, 
the FARDC was widely distrusted, even feared, by the general population.  As MONUC 
was seen operating shoulder to shoulder with the FARDC, the legitimacy of the UN 
force, and its DDRRR program, was damaged by the actions of the FARDC.137  
 But coercive methods of DDR utilized by MONUC should not be condemned 
outright.  Although the operations in Walungu and Bunyakiri did not result in significant 
increases in DDRRR of FDLR combatants, the campaign against Ituri militias is largely 
considered to have contributed to the relative stability currently observed in the province.  
From early 2005, MONUC conducted some of the most aggressive actions ever seen by 
UN forces and by June of that year claimed the successful disarmament of some 15,000 
combatants through cordon-and-search operations and preemptive operations against 
armed militias.138 In fact, the majority of militia leaders in the DRC who have 
surrendered to the DDR process have done so only in the face of resolute UN forces.139 
But why then were the operations in South Kivu less successful? 
 Comparison of the operations in Ituri and those in Walungu and Bunyakiri 
provides valuable discussion points for the debate of voluntary versus coercive DDR and 
DDRRR structures in the eastern Congo.  The first factor is the demographic differences 
of the armed groups.  The militias in Ituri were the UPC and FNI.  Although they were 
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split on ethnic lines, they were both considered to be Congolese.  The FDLR in the 
Kivus, however, are primarily Hutu fighters from Rwanda.  This created a significantly 
more complex situation for the combatants of the FDLR as they were faced with 
repatriation to Rwanda where they would possibly face prosecution for crimes committed 
during the 1994 genocide.  Second, the absence of strong participation of the MONUC 
DDRRR unit in the Walungu and Bunyakiri operations meant that there was no 
acceptable DDRRR process for FDLR combatants.  In contrast, almost simultaneous to 
the robust response from MONUC to FNI aggression, the UNDP assisted the Congolese 
government in establishing five DDR centers to process FNI militia members.140 Finally, 
there existed vast differences in force strength and coordination mechanisms between 
Ituri and the Kivus.  UN agencies had created a specific DDR program in Ituri, separate 
from the inefficiencies of the national program.  Additional support was also present as 
more grassroot conflict prevention initiatives and nongovernmental organization operated 
in Ituri than in any other Congolese province.141 The overall force size between the 
provinces was asymmetrical.  In September of 2003, MONUC had deployed almost half 
of its 10,800 troops to Ituri in addition to the EU lead Operation Artemis that, in May of 
2003, saw the deployment of 1,800 European troops under with France as lead nation.142 
This meant that while MONUC forces in Ituri could secure a location and force 
belligerents into the DDR program, the territory swept clean by MONUC and the 
FARDC in the Kivus was not held and was quickly repopulated by FDLR units who 
exacted revenge on the local population who they accused of assisting MONUC.143 
Additionally, poor coordination with the FARDC in the two operations in South Kivu 
greatly hindered success.  Disgruntled FARDC units, operating months without pay, 
collaborated with FDLR assisting them to escape in some instances.  This point provides 
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a good transition into the next chapter, which focuses on the links between DDR and 
SSR, specifically the manner in which FARDC units were formed in Army integration 
through the national DDR framework. 
In summation, MONUC’s voluntary framework for the support of the national 
DDR program and the DDRRR of regional foreign combatants has a crisis of identity.  
Although a voluntary structure aligned with UN norms of traditional peacekeeping and 
force neutrality, its foundation rests on the presence of a comprehensive peace.  The 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement provided the document, but peace in the eastern districts of 
Ituri, North, and South Kivu is far from comprehensive even 12 years later.  The FDLR 
and LRA also present unique problems as they are foreign armed groups with no real 
political stake in the DRC.  This has contributed to their ongoing resistance to voluntary 
framework and led to several MONUC operations against their forces.  The complex 
nature of the conflict in the east has forced MONUC forces to employ their Chapter VII 
mandate on numerous occasions to protect themselves and the civilian population.  Once 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 61
VI. LINKS TO SSR – THE BRASSAGE PROCESS 
Key to the long-term stability of the DRC, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has 
been a prominent pillar of MONUC’s mission and has been key to the ongoing success of 
DDR activities.  Broadly defined as “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities 
that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security and 
justice,”144 SSR has been inextricably linked to the PNDDR through the role of army 
integration, also known as brassage.  The brassage process in the DRC was one of two 
tracks offered to ex-combatants who entered the national program, the second being full 
demobilization and reintegration into civilian life.  Serving as both a track for the 
processing of ex-combatants and as a tool for army reform, the brassage process is vital 
to both DDR and SSR.  Serving the PNDDR, brassage provided an avenue for Congolese 
rebel soldiers and community militiamen immediately to integrate into the national army, 
avoiding many of the pitfalls inherent in the demobilization and community reintegration 
process.  As a step in SSR, it helps to provide the manpower to the newly forming 
national army.  However, the brassage process was severely flawed in several ways and 
presented as many problems as it solved.  First, inadequate funding for sensitization, 
army training and salaries has created a situation where FARDC units pursue abusive 
actions against the population for personal, ethnic or financial reasons.  Second, the 
process did not adequately demobilize integrated individuals and units, allowing for 
polarization of the FARDC and parallel chains of command.  Finally, proper structures 
were not created to provide for systematic selection and rejection of combatants wishing 
to join the FARDC.  This allowed for inconsistent recruitment that included the 
incorporation of foreign combatants, child soldiers, and perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, in contravention of Articles 180 and 184 of the Transitional Constitution. 
                                                 




Although the process of DDR and army integration was linked in theory and 
design, the funding structures remained segregated, undermining the dual track 
process.145 Although ex-combatants were filtered into these two tracks, the funding levels 
for the different programs were unbalanced, with $200 million allocated for 
demobilization and only $14 million assigned to army integration.146 This weakness first 
became apparent with the Bukavu crisis in May of 2004.  Apart from the inherent failure 
this represented to the brassage process, as newly integrated RCD-G units of the FARDC 
were directly engaging loyalist troops, the Transitional Government also broke with the 
established dual track program and moved 15,000 unintegrated troops to the eastern 
province to assist in stabilizing the region.  The move not only further stressed the 
balance of power in the region, but also was used as cover for the embezzlement of 
millions of dollars allocated for transportation and logistical needs.147  
Simultaneous with these developments in 2004, and hindered by a lack of 
financial autonomy as the CGFDR controlled the funding mechanisms, CONADER’s 
DDR actives were paralyzed in the region preventing forward progress.148 In response to 
these setbacks, the Security Council mandated MONUC to establish three joint 
commissions in October 2004, one of which was tasked with oversight of SSR.149 
Traveling to the east to tour the brassage centers three months after its establishment, the 
SSR commission found a dismal situation.  Lacking adequate food, water, shelter, 
medicine, electricity, and basic equipment, combatants and their dependents had 
abandoned the centers for nearby shantytowns and had resorted to pillaging the 
surrounding communities to secure basic necessities.150  
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The crisis in Bakavu split wide open issues of funding in the brassage process 
specifically, and the DDR program overall.  At the international level, partner states and 
international organizations did not have a coherent strategy for fund allocation to the 
overall process.  While some donors chose to finance the MDRP and its DDR goals, 
others financed the Congolese defense ministry bilaterally, often circumventing the 
collective efforts of the MDRP.151 Although bilateral funding for SSR objectives directly 
with the Congolese government proved debilitating to the overall DDR process, such 
behavior is common in post-conflict environments as the host government seeks to 
strengthen aid relationships with individual states that will provide less pressure to 
conform to certain standards.152 At the national level, the PNDDR experienced 
significant hurdles between CONADER, charged with DDR program execution, and the 
CGFDR, which managed DDR finances.  Coinciding with the events in Bukavu in 2004, 
the CGFDR repeatedly blocked the disbursement of funds to CONADER, severely 
hindering the DDR progress.153 This problem was eventually solved in 2005 when a 
presidential decree dissolved the CGFDR, transferring financial management over to 
CONADER, yet rampant corruption and political infighting continues to take its toll on 
program efficiency. 
As established above, financial coordination has had serious negative effects on 
the structural linkages of SSR and DDR in the peace-building process.  But these 
shortcomings have not been confined to the structural level alone.  At the operational 
level, gaps in funding have repeatedly disrupted the brassage process.  Lack of funds at 
the ground level have left FARDC salaries unpaid on repeated occasions causing 
disregard for the command structure and abuse of the population.  Funding for 
sensitization and training has also been meager as combatants who chose to stay in the 
brassage track receive only a 45 day training course meant to sensitize the soldiers to 
human rights and sexual violence in addition to providing military training and 
                                                 
151 Mobekk, “Security Sector Reform,” 278. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Onana and Taylor, “MONUC and SSR,” 508. 
 64
organization.154 Thus, in addition to operational inefficiencies, the FARDC continuously 
ranked high in reports of human rights abuses including rape, murder, and torture. 
B. UNIT INTEGRATION 
Since its formation in 2004, the FARDC has been plagued by operational 
inefficiencies on the nominal side and outright rebellion and war on the extreme.  The 
simple fact that the FARDC is set out to be the amalgamation and assimilation of former 
FAC, RCD-G, RCD-ML, MLC, FNI and various other militias, all separated by extensive 
ethnic and geographic differences, has made group cohesion difficult to attain.  The 
brassage process intended to break down those who chose army integration over 
demobilization into individuals and reassemble mixed brigades out of the 45 day training 
course.  Soldiers naturally gravitated towards leaders of a common ethnicity or previous 
rebel movement and often refused postings where they did not feel their group enjoyed 
that majority.155 This continues to lead to disunity in the forces and crimes of revenge by 
members of the FARDC against former adversaries. 
Although the FARDC eventually retook Bakavu in July 2004 from the RCD-G 
dissidents, the problem of rebellion from within the force did not disappear.  Citing a lack 
of protection for the Banyamulenge in the Kivus, General Laurent Nkunda led the assault 
on Bakavu and maintained a strong following of ex-RCD-G soldiers.  After engaging in 
talks with the Congolese government, Nkunda agreed to allow his forces into a “mixage” 
process whereby his forces would maintain unit organization but would be commanded 
side by side with other integrated FARDC brigades.156 This proved to be an extremely 
costly move for the process of army integration as Nkunda continued to operate 
autonomously from FARDC leadership.  Emerging with the new CNDP movement, 
Nkunda enjoyed support from all of his brigades gained during the mixage process and 
waged a war against the FDLR, self-funded through the illegal exploitation of minerals.  
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The danger of mixage was further emphasized in 2008 when several top CNDP 
commanders, having been integrated into the FARDC, were confirmed present and in 
command of troops at the Kiwanja massacre of Congolese noncombatants.157 While 
Nkunda was arrested by Rwanda in January of 2009 and his CNDP disintegrated back 
into the FARDC, army integration continues to be challenged by parallel command 
structures and contains several unitegrated brigades who have yet to go through the 
brassage process. 
C. SELECTION PROCESS 
In addition to the issues relating to funding and structuring of army integration, 
the SSR-DDR process lacked a coherent method for determining eligibility for army 
integration versus demobilization and reintegration.  From the very beginning of the 
DDR program Congolese transitional leaders undermined the process by demanding a 
quota system to ensure even numbers of combatants from each of the belligerent forces.  
Due to the fact that every faction had inflated its numbers of combatants the quota system 
began to imply coerced enrollment into the army reintegration track by ex-combatants as 
recruits were falling far short of the predetermined numbers.158 This demand for 
integration encouraged the relaxing of standards for recruits and would create future 
issues for the DDR process. 
Although proscribed by the Transition Constitution and 2006 national 
Constitution, the use of child soldiers by the FARDC continued.  Child soldiers who 
entered the PNDDR program and chose army integration were turned away only if they 
were suspected of war crimes or possessed an overt physical ailment.159 Children utilized 
by CNDP and FARDC forces were actively hidden from UN authorities during the 
mixage process and continued to be processed into the national army as late as 2007.160 
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On 17 February 2007, the then FARDC Chief of Staff informed all officers that they 
would be held responsible for continued military service of any children prompting a 
slight decrease in their numbers, yet the problem persists to the present.161 
In addition to child soldiers, the admittance of perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity and integration of foreigners has presented roadblocks to the army integration 
process.  The presence of war criminals within the leadership of the FARDC (the most 
notable of which perhaps is former UPC and CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda who, in 
addition to being a Rwandan national, is wanted by the ICC for war crimes) has presented 
MONUC with complex problems as it seeks to support the FARDC yet remain 
accountable to international law.  Although CONADER has developed some methods for 
screening foreign combatants who try to enter the brassage process, it has failed to create 
linkages with MONUC and DDRRR actors to ensure those turned away continue to be 
processed rather than returned to the field.162 
In summation, funding for DDR and SSR related activities has been inconsistent 
and uncoordinated.  Insufficient and mismanaged funding has occurred at the 
international, national, and operation levels of the brassage process and has generated 
missed opportunities in DDR and further stresses the conflict dynamics in the region.  
The process of demobilization of units has also created serious problems for army 
integration.  FARDC units have been insufficiently trained and integrated, creating a 
force that has become, in many instances, as violent and abusive as the rebel forces it 
opposes.  Finally, the selection criteria established by the FARDC and CONADER has 
proven insufficient in providing proper screening of combatants.  On countless occasions 
the FARDC has unconstitutionally incorporated child soldiers and foreign combatants 
into its ranks.  Additionally, FARDC leadership has looked the other way when 
integrating commanders and units are guilty of war crimes.  In addition to creating a 
poorly trained, unprofessional force, the lack of criteria for recruitment has contributed to  
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the FARDC’s less then exemplary track record on human rights.  Although MONUC 
cannot bear the entirety of the blame for the FARDC’s shortcomings and abuses, the 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
MONUC/MONUSCO is operating in its twelfth year in the DRC and there does 
not seem to be a definitive exit date.  Although headquartered in Kinshasa, MONUSCO 
maintains its largest force numbers in the east, where rampant insecurity is still a 
paramount problem.  This thesis does not suggest that the UN efforts in DDR and 
DDRRR through MONUC and MONUSCO have been a failure.  Such a supposition 
would be in ignorance of the many DDR successes achieved by the mission in the past 
decade.  It is also important to note that the DDR(RR) programs run by MONUSCO are 
ongoing, their conclusion remaining to be seen.  Instead, this thesis will conclude in three 
sections.  First, the nature of the security environment in which UN DDR(RR) activities 
have been operating is important.  Demographics, physical geography, exogenous forces, 
and endogenous factors have all had their effect on the DDR(RR) programs.  While the 
mission did successfully adapt in several ways to security environment, ultimately this 
only occurred in reaction to failure. 
Secondly, UN DDR(RR) programs in the eastern provinces suffered from an array 
of operational problems.  Coordination of DDR funds was poorly managed and in some 
cases negatively impacted the process.  Additionally, the link to SSR, in the form of 
brassage, was poorly thought out and was used as a “shortcut” around full 
demobilization.  The setbacks experienced from failed attempts at army integration have 
been the catalyst for renewed violence and have damaged the legitimacy of both the 
FARDC and MONUC forces.  Finally, the voluntary framework for DDR(RR) has, at 
times, been at odds with the mission’s Chapter VII responsibilities.  As protection of the 
civilian population became a priority for the mission, MONUC was forced to take robust 
military actions against armed aggressors.  These actions often conflicted with the stated 
voluntary framework for DDR(RR).  Finally, this paper concludes with suggestions for 
future DDR(RR) operations based on the experiences of MONUC. 
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A. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
As reviewed in Chapter III, the demographics of the Congo are vastly diverse and 
contain a myriad of ethnic relationships and conflicts. Accordingly, conflict in the eastern 
provinces of Ituri and the Kivus is multidimensional. Ethnic differences at the community 
level, such as the Hema-Lendu conflict in Ituri or the Banyamulenge in the Kivus have 
created exceedingly localized conflict.  Thus, even if peace accords like the ones signed 
in Lusaka in 1999 and Pretoria in 2002 were able to stabilize conflict between regional 
states and large rebel movements (which they didn’t), they did very little to ensure 
community security. Without a comprehensive sense of security combatants have not felt 
safe enough to disarm.  This was the cited claim by Laurent Nkunda between 2004 and 
2009 as his CNDP movement remained mobilized and militant claiming inadequate 
protection of the Banyamulenge population in the Kivus. Likewise the continued 
existence of Mai Mai militias throughout the east, remain vigilant in the protection of 
their communities. 
Commensurate with the ethnic diversity has been the number of armed actors 
operating since the conflict began in the mid-1990s. In addition to the presence of foreign 
militaries, over twelve different armed, nonstate actors have characterized conflict in the 
eastern DRC. In the face of this proliferation of armed groups, the challenges to 
successful DDR become exponential, as a program must accommodate each group’s 
specific needs as best as possible. Because each movement represented a different 
constituency with different reasons for rebelling, this has proved a difficult task for DDR 
planners. 
The regional security environment has also provided difficulties to the DDRRR 
process. The lack of a strong Congolese state means that many communities in the east 
feel less of a connection with the Kinshasa government than they do with neighboring 
Uganda, Rwanda or Burundi.  Banyarwandan, Banyamulenge, Tutsi, and Hutu ethnicities 
in the east all find greater cultural and historical ties to the interlacustrine states than a 
sense of Congolese nationality.  Following the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwanda 
forces in 2003, the two countries continued to undermine the security situation through 
covert support of Congolese rebel movements and militias.  As MONUC DDR initiatives 
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sought to pacify these movements, little effort was made to address the broader issue of 
foreign support.  Currently the largest threat to stability in the east, the FDLR is 
inextricably linked to Rwanda.  Guilty of genocide crimes in 1994, the hard line 
leadership of the FDLR refuses repatriation to Rwanda and actively disrupts 
communications and information sharing between FDLR combatants and their original 
communities in Rwanda.  But the group is also unwelcome in the Kivus where various 
militias have risen up to protect against FDLR abuses on the local Congolese Tutsi 
population. 
Geography also presents a major obstacle to security and effective DDR.  Dense 
forests, high mountain ranges, and a lack of transportation infrastructure create an 
environment where large forces can disappear and hide with relative ease.  Additionally, 
the geographic area of focus of DDR activities is vast in the DRC.  This has presented 
barriers to voluntary enrollment in DDR as many combatants have to travel far, and often 
outside the safety of their host community, to reach a cantonment zone or DDR center. In 
addition to providing barriers to movement, the geography of the eastern DRC is rich in 
easily extractable mineral resources.  A blessing to a state that enjoys a monopoly of 
power over its borders and a healthy economy, the abundant resources in the DRC has 
been a curse.  Rebel groups have been able to illegally remove resources from the land 
and use the profits to fund their movements.  Combined with the vast, dense landscape, 
this wealth has made it easy for belligerent forces to acquire weapons from foreign 
sources to maintain their military strength. 
In summation, the context of the conflict into which MONUC deployed and 
supported DDR(RR) initiatives was and still is hugely complex.  Although many of these 
factors were individually identified early in the mission’s deployment, the overall 
complexity born from the sum of these factors was underestimated. 
B. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Operationally, MONUC faced challenges in coordination with a myriad of foreign 
donors and international initiatives.  The dire situation in the DRC did not go unnoticed 
in the international community, but the lack of strategic interest by any of the Permanent 
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Members of the Security Council, funding for a robust UN mission was not immediately 
forthcoming.  Additionally, as funding did begin to arrive for DDR activities, proper 
coordination between funders was absent as international and bilateral agreements 
distributed funds unevenly.  This took the form of asymmetrical funding for community 
reintegration and army integration, missed opportunities as DDR units were not 
effectively coordinated with during peace enforcement operations, and inconsistent 
funding for DDR activities between the large MDRP initiative and various other bilateral 
programs. 
Perhaps the most visible operational issue in DDR activities has been the army 
integration process of brassage.  Aimed at addressing SSR and DDR objectives, brassage 
has produced setbacks to both.  Poorly integrated FARDC units have been cited multiple 
times for human rights violations and have on several occasions mutinied against state 
control, reverting back to their prior rebel leadership.  Provided as one of two tracks in 
the PNDDR, brassage’s 45 day training program has proven insufficient at demobilizing 
former combatants and realigning their allegiance to the national government.  
Additionally, the selection process has been marred by inconsistency as child soldiers, 
foreign combatants, and perpetrators of human rights violations have been allowed to 
integrate into the FARDC. 
The use of a voluntary framework for DDR(RR) activities must also be 
reevaluated.  Noted for its large and well-armed force, relative to UN peacekeeping, 
MONUC has undertaken some of the most aggressive actions ever carried out by UN 
forces.  A response to continued insecurity, justified under the mission’s Chapter VII 
mandate, and in the name of civilian protection, these robust actions have challenged the 
voluntary DDR(RR) framework.  UN actions in Ituri, Walungu and Bunyakiri are prime 
examples of robust operations, which stood at odds with the mission’s voluntary DDR 
framework.  But while those in Ituri have contributed to the province’s relative stability, 
the actions in South Kivu have not been viewed under such a positive light.  This 
difference is likely attributable to the mission’s overall commitment in Ituri and the 
presence of close coordination between MONUC military forces and the DDR unit.  
While Ituri had large numbers of troops and a fully deployed DDR structure, smaller 
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MONUC forces in conjunction with FARDC forces that possessed questionable training 
and loyalty carried out the operations in Walungu and Bunyakiri.  Additionally, the 
operations were not adequately coordinated with the DDRRR unit to ensure the 
successful processing and repatriation of captured FDLR units. 
While voluntary frameworks for DDR are not to be dismissed, they rely on the 
presence of a peace to be kept, in the form of a viable and comprehensive peace 
agreement.  Although peace agreements were signed during the conflict, none of these 
agreements has been able to provide a comprehensive peace between all armed 
belligerents.  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement forged a tentative peace between all of the 
sovereign states present in the Congo basin.  The Global All-Inclusive Agreement signed 
in Pretoria in 2002 provided an agreement between the major rebel factions, RCD and 
MLC, and the Congolese government.  However, due to the multi-faceted nature of the 
conflict, and a lack of credible state institutions with which to negotiate, a comprehensive 
and defendable peace was never achieved.  This simple fact should provide fair warning 
to all planners who seek to utilize a voluntary framework for DDR operations.  The DRC 
provides a strong example that, without a comprehensive peace to keep, voluntary DDR 
will almost certainly fail to secure the enrollment of belligerents. 
Thus inadequate funding, poorly designed linkages to SSR, and a reliance on 
voluntary methods have plagued UN led DDR(RR) operations.  Although the mission has 
not yet concluded, and the security situation in the east is far from resolved, these 
operational lessons provide valuable insight into UN DDR operational guidelines. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
Lesson #1: DDR funding must be properly planned and coordinated 
at the international, national, and local levels to avoid 
counterproductive initiatives and operational setbacks. 
The presence of multiple UN and international initiatives in DDR has proven to be 
debilitating to the overall DDR process in the DRC.  The presence of World Bank and 
other various bilateral funding for DDR(RR) initiatives in the DRC often provided 
contradictions in the programs and slow response time on the ground.  Although the 
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GoDRC has established a dual track program for the PNDDR, funding was asymmetrical 
for the two tracks, creating biased implementation of the program.  Additionally, the 
proliferation of DDR bodies under the GoDRC created unneeded complexity and 
provided the cover for corruption and misappropriation of funds.  Meanwhile, the 
DDRRR of foreign combatants was largely neglected, remaining the major source of 
insecurity in the east. 
Lesson #2: Military integration is not a shortcut around the 
demobilization process. 
Although the DDR need for the dismantling of rebel armies and militias coincided with 
the SSR objective of creating a national armed forces, the process of brassage proved to 
create as many problems as it solved.  While FARDC brigades were stood up in a 
relatively small amount of time, brassage has compromised the force’s integrity and 
functionality.  The eastern provinces are far removed from army headquarters in 
Kinshasa.  The Great Lakes conflict system is also defined by rampant insecurities and 
community level conflict that the brassage process has failed to recognize.  Thus FARDC 
units that have been assembled through brassage have only occasionally represented the 
needs of the nation and have often been perpetrators of egregious acts against the 
population.  The current FARDC force, intended to relieve the expensive MONUSCO 
mission of peacekeeping and security tasks, has proven inadequate. 
Lesson #3: Once a Chapter VII mandate was established for 
MONUC, the voluntary framework for DDR should have been 
reevaluated. 
 Although, as mentioned in Chapter V, it is incorrect to directly correlate Chapter VII 
mandates and coercive DDR, the presence of a large number of warring parties, the 
absence of a comprehensive peace, and a mission mandate to protect the civilian 
population all have made voluntary DDR impractical.  Eventually faced with open 
confrontation against belligerent parties in the name of civilian defense, MONUC was 
forced to take coercive action without commensurate coercive DDR policies.  This does 
not suggest that MONUC should abandon its voluntary framework entirely for a coercive 
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model, rather that the recognition of its coercive military actions by the DDR unit would 
better serve its DDR process instead of reacting to these actions in an ad hoc nature. 
 UN led DDR(RR) efforts in the eastern DRC continue to evolve to meet the 
demands of the conflict environment.  As the UN mission enters its thirteenth year, a 
review of the national DDR and DDRRR of foreign combatants reveals programmatic 
evolution in reaction to events on the ground.  Founded on a Traditional DDR 
framework, MONUC supported DDR(RR) efforts have incorporated many of the aspects 
present in Second Generation DDR.  While many successes have emerged, the absence of 
a comprehensive peace and the reliance on a voluntary framework has continued to 
plague the success of the programs.  Armed militias, like the Mai Mai, continue to 
operate in the eastern districts of the DRC, resistant to the DDR(RR) programs present 
there, because the Congolese government and MONUSCO are incapable of maintaining a 
secure environment, necessary to facilitate voluntarily DDR.  Additionally, foreign 
groups like the FDLR and LRA face barriers to their repatriation that Congolese 
programs cannot address.  These groups have shown, time and time again, a total 
disinterest in repatriation to a society that will undoubtedly prosecute them for their 
crimes.  And they are not welcome in the Congo where their presence is the source of 
continued violence and illegal resource extraction.  Thus poor coordination at the 
national, international, and local level, the failure in SSR to create a viable Congolese 
defense force, and the UN’s continued focus on voluntary methods of DDR(RR) have 
stalled the progress of the DDR(RR) programs and allowed for the continued presence of 
armed nonstate groups in the east. 
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